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INTRODUCTION
This Article is based on a presentation at the Michigan Journal of
Gender and Law as part of their symposium "Rhetoric & Relevance: An
Investigation into the Present & Future of Feminist Legal Theory." In it,
I explore the problem of categorical exclusions to the consent doctrine
in private intimate relationships through the lens of the HBO series Big
Love, which is about modern polygamy. There remains the normative
*Professor of Law, Vermont Law School. The author would like to thank the out-
standing staff at the Michigan Journal of Gender &- Law for their outstanding work on
this Article. Thanks also to Clare Cragan, my research assistant, and Ginny Burniham,
my administrative assistant, for their help. This Article was supported by a Vermont
Law School scholarship stipend, so many thanks for the institutional support. The
views expressed are solely the author's, who can be contacted at
channa~avermontlaw.edu.
III
112 ~MICHIGAN JOURN L OF GENDER & LAW [o.1:1
question both after Lawrence v. Texas and in feminist legal theory of un-
der what circumstances individuals should be able to consent to activity
that takes place within the context of a private, intimate relationship.
The tensions between individual autonomy and state interests are beau-
tifully explored in Big Love. Drawing on themes presented in the series,
this Article asks if there is any principled way to make the distinction
between those relationships in which there is some physical or psycho-
logical harm inflicted and those in which the state has proscribed a
relationship because of some moral or social harm it allegedly causes.
Four case studies are presented to prompt readers to try to answer the
question of when consent should be a defense to otherwise proscribed
activity. I conclude that the future of feminist legal theory depends on
its ability to remain ambivalent about the tensions presented in the con-
sent doctrine as applied to contexts such as polygamy, prostitution,
sadomasochistic sex, obscenity, and domestic violence. Big Love seeks to
persuade us to accept ambivalence and to be open to changing our
minds because of the complicated nature of womens (and mens) lives;
feminist legal theory ought to persuade us to do the same.
Anyone who wants to understand the present and future of femi-
nist legal theory ought to watch the HBO series Big Love. (Warning:
viewers may find the show highly addictive.) Big Love is about a modern
polygamist family in Utah. The patriarch is a man named Bill Henrick-
son who was raised on a polygamist compound, got expelled as a teen
when he became a sexual threat to the older males, and found his way to
a monogamous world. He marries his first love, Barb, has three children,
and is a successful businessperson. But when Ba-rb gets cancer and can
no longer have children, he decides to "live by the principle" and begins
taking other wives. Barb is beautiful and educated and otherwise com-
pletely sane but for the fact that she agrees, however reluctantly, to the
family's ever-expanding footprint. As the series ended its fourth season,
Bill had three wives and eight children, all of whom live in three houses
in a modern suburban development. Bill briefly had a fourth wife, but
she left when she couldn't handle the complicated family dynamics. She
is also now pregnant with Bill's child, and she and her foreign fiance
have returned to the Henrickson homestead as they try to game the
immigration system. Indeed, Stanley Fish has dubbed the Henrickson
family "the new 'Waltons' "' for its nostalgic portrayal of multigenera-
tional, large families.
The show highlights that to the extent that Barb and the other
wives consent to polygamy, they do so in a world in which their choices
1. Opinionator, http://fish.blogs. nytimes.com/2009/02/01 /Iooking-for-someone-to-like/
(Feb. 1, 2009, 21:00 EST).
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are inevitably constrained by material needs and their own spiritual be-
liefs, and, most profoundly for Barb, by her love for Bill. Big Love
reminds us of a nearly universal desire to be in a relationship, which
then often leads us to accept situations we never anticipated or wanted.
Yet, Big Loves polygamy is not obviously exploitative. It is fairly
democratic, with the "sister-wives" having a voice in both how the fain-
ily functions and who gets to join. True, each new "sister-wife" is
younger (and hotter) than the last one, but there are no child-brides be-
ing forced into sexual servitude. Indeed, it is often the wives who run
the show, and usually run Bill, who often seems powerless relative to
their collective force. These are adult women who make their own
decisions, and despite the expected jealousy and power struggles, the
"tsister-wives" share a special and affirming bond. (My best friend once
commented that Big Love makes polygamy look pretty attractive. There
are more hands on-deck to take care of the kids, you only have to give
your husband limited attention, and when you sit around and complain
to your friends about him, it is the same guy, so everyone can empa-
thize).
This post-Sex-in-the-City-meets-Desperate-Housewives polygamy
stands in sharp contrast to polygamy on the religious compound where
Bill grew up and where his parents and brother still live. Bill's father-in-
law, via his second wife Nicki, is Roman Grant, the compound's leader.
The state unsuccessfully prosecuted Grant for forcing young girls to
sexually submit to husbands they did not choose. This sexually exploit-
ive polygamy robs young girls of any autonomy and freedom before they
even reach the age of legal consent.2 Thus, we are left to decide whether
there is truly a way for us (the viewers and the state) to distinguish be-
tween a kind of "sister-wifehood-is-powerful" polygamy practiced by the
Henrickson family and the kind of grotesquely "patriarchal and oppres-
sive polygamy" that exploits girls and women, as well as outcasts many
boys,' practiced on the compound.
One of the central tensions in Big Love is the question of consent
and its relationship to the law. The Henrickson family is always con-
cerned that their private polygamy will become public and that they will
lose everything. They are not just worried about public condemnation
but also about the state raiding their cul-de-sac and taking away their
children. Bill could be prosecuted under Utahs bigamy law for living
2. See, e.g., State v. Green, 99 P.3d 820, 830 (Utah 2004) (upholding polygamy prose-
cution and articulating the state's compelling interest in keeping underage girls safe
from sexual abuse and forced marriage).
3. Brieanne M. Billie, The "Lost Boys" of Polygamy: Is Emancipation the Answer?, 12 J.
GENDER RACE & JUST. 127, 133-135 (2008-2009).
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with three women as husband and wife.' At the end of the fourth sea-
son, the family decides to go public with their polygamy at Bill's
insistence after he wins a seat in the Utah State Senate, and viewers are
left anxiously wondering whether Bill's decision to go public will liberate
or condemn the family.
Of particular concern for the wives is their economic vulnerability.
Only Barb, the first wife, enjoys the legal protections and the benefits of
a public marriage. Therefore, as the show makes clear, even though all
the adults consent and the children are unharmed, the state's refusal to
recognize plural marriage leaves the other two wives and their children
economically vulnerable were those marriages to end or Bill were to be
out of the picture. That is why Bill assures third wife Margene's mother
that his lawyer has drawn a will that ensures that upon his death Mar-
gene and her three children will receive a portion of his estate.
Nevertheless, each of the wives consciously struggles to maintain her
own financial independence: Barb manages the familys casino; Nicki
runs up credit card debt and struggles with a gambling addiction; and
Margene starts her own successful jewelry business. While Bill is con-
sumed with living in the light and taking a stand against those who
condemn the Principle, the wives are worried about how they will feed
the children if public exposure ruins the family businesses.
Although the show is complicated and sometimes ventures too far
into the land of the unbelievable, its basic premise is both simple and
profound. Big Love asks us to ponder whether Barb and her sister-wives
have a right to make their own choices, however bad or degrading or sad
those choices might be to viewers, and what the role of the state should
be in either recognizing or condemning those choices. At the end of
each episode, viewers are left feeling completely ambivalent about these
dilemmas, which is why this show is a perfect lens through which to
contemplate feminist legal theory.
1. FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY AND THE BIG LOVE DILEMMA
It is in light of Big Love that I have been rethinking modern femi-
nist legal theory and its continued relevance to the legal dilemmas of our
4. UTAH CODE AN.N. § 76-7-101(l) (2003). Utah provides for the state recognition of
common law marriages for the purposes of defining bigamy, and therefore, no actual
issuance of a state marriage license is required. See 'Whyte v. Blair, 885 P.2d 791,
793-94 (Utah 1994).
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time. Feminist legal theory is a rich and complicated field.' It is respon-
sible for many reforms that have improved the lives of women,
including changes in family law, domestic violence law, workplace dis-
crimination law, sexual harassment law, and rape law. But it is a field
that can sometimes appear at odds with itself. Early debates within
feminist legal theory centered around questions of formal versus sub-
stantive equality, questioning whether the law ought to treat men and
women the same, or whether sometimes-as in the context of preg-
nancy, for example-gender matters.' It is often hard to predict what
feminist legal theory will conclude, and this tends to undermine its
normative legitimacy The theorys conclusions vary so widely in part
because we continue to debate whether or not women are really victims
of their circumstances or autonomous agents in shaping their lives,7 and
to what extent the law ought to protect women from the seemingly
harmful choices they might make. One should not assume, for example,
that feminist legal theory would describe polygamy as per se exploitation
any more than one should assume that it would describe single-sex pub-
lic schools as per se gender discrimination. As with the growing
sophistication of any field, context matters and ambiguity abounds.
This dilemma is particularly complicated relative to the doctrine of
consent in private, intimate relationships. There remains the normative
question in law and in feminist legal theory of under what circum-
stances individuals should be able to consent to activity that takes places
within the context of such relationships. This Article explores that ques-
tion and asks if there is any principled way to distinguish between
relationships that involve violence and those that are non-violent but
may offend some social values unrelated to physical safety, such as the
preference for monogamous marriage over plural marriage.
The future of feminist legal theory, however, does not depend on its
ability to offer an affirmative answer this question. Those who prefer a
more limited consent doctrine, for example, are no less feminist than
those who prefer an expanded one. No matter what normative rule we
adopt, there will be consequences, both anticipated and unforeseen, that
5. See generally Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Mainstreaming Feminist Legal Theory, 23 PAC.
L.J. 1493 (1992) (reviewing borh the dilemmas and the accomplishments of the
field).
6. See Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Dialectic of Rights and Politics: Perspectives from the
Women's Movement, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 589, 628-29 (1986) (discussing various ways
in which political and legal theorists have characterized rights in general and women's
rights in particular).
7. See Elizabeth M. Schneider, Particularity and Generality: Challenges of Feminist Theory
and Practice in Work on Woman-Abuse, 67 N.Y.U. L. Ray. 520, 548-50 (1992) (dis-
cussing the tensions between victimization and agency).
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will create dilemmas for the law and for those individuals it affects.
Thus, the future of feminist theory depends on its ability to have a sus-
tained and rich conversation that continually revisits our assumptions
and examines the impact of our theories on the real lives of women.
The future of feminist theory requires us to revisit our past and to
humbly, yet passionately, embrace future ambiguities. The ambiguities
raised by the question of consent will keep feminist legal theory alive
and relevant in the decades to come. We need more seasons of feminist
legal theory and Big Love, and I'm looking forward to both.
11. REVISITING CONSENT
In this Article, I revisit my own scholarly past. Nearly a decade ago,
in an article entitled Sex is Not a Sport: Consent and Violence in Criminal
Law,' I examined the question of when the state should allow for con-
sent in intimate relationships in which one person has physically harmed
another. At the time, there were a growing number of cases, both do-
mestic' and international, 0 in which people involved in sadomasochistic
relationships were being prosecuted for assault and battery when the
injury to the victim was significant, or had the potential to be signifi-
cant. With rare exception, courts have held that individuals could not
consent to activity that had the potential to cause serious bodily harm
despite the sexual nature of the encounter." Unlike sports, where there
has been a long-recognized social utility in the activity and where there
are clearly defined rules by which players must abide,'12 both American
and international judges generally have refused to extend the doctrine of
consent to sexual activity that involved the intentional infliction of bod-
ily harm.'"
The sports exception, I argued, was inherently gendered, creating a
legal standard of what I termed civilized masculinity, in which men
8. See generally Cheryl Hanna, Sex Is Not a Sport- Consent and Violence in Criminal Law,
42 B.C. L. Ray. 239 (2001).
9. See, e.g., State v. Collier, 372 N.W.2d 303, 303 (Iowa Ct. App. 1985); People v.
Jovanovic, 700 N.Y.S.2d 156, 156 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999); State v. Hardy, Ohio
LEXIS 4588, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997); State v. Roquemore, 85 Ohio App. 3d
448, 448 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993).
10. See e.g., R v. Christopher, BC9906145 (Supreme Court of Victoria-Criminal)
(1999); R v. Brown, I A.C. 212 (Eng. H.L. 1993) [hereinafter Regina].
11. See Hanna, supra note 8, at 256-68 (reviewing cases in which consent was a defense
to sadomasochistic activity and finding that most courts refused to accept this as a de-
fense).
12. Id. at 249-56 (reviewing cases involving injuries sustained during a sporting activity).
13. See generally id. at 250-52.
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could consent to limited exposure to violence as long as it was con-
trolled within the greater public sphere."4 Despite the gendered roots of
the consent doctrine, however, I largely agreed with the lalws refusal to
extend consent to injuries caused during sexual activity, including sa-
domasochistic sex. I argued that once defendants, all of whom have been
male, could claim that the victim, almost always women or younger
men, consented to violence, the ability to prosecute domestic abusers
would be deeply frustrated." While this article focused specifically on
cases involving sadomasochistic sex, it certainly has implications beyond
that context to other relationships in which consent may negate culpa-
bility, such as polygamy, in which the inherent risk of harm, be it
physical or emotional, is significant.
Since the publication of that article, however, there have been a
number of developments in law and legal scholarship that invite a re-
examination of the doctrine of consent in the context of intimate rela-
tionships, both violent and nonviolent. First, the United States Supreme
Court's opinion in Lawrence v. Texas has opened up the questions as to
what limits, if any, the state can place on private, sexual, consensual
conduct. Second, there is a growing debate among feminist legal schol-
ars over the appropriate role of state intervention in intimate
relationships where the alleged victim neither welcomes nor wants that
intervention. Third, there has been a shift in how feminist legal theory
has come to understand sex and marriage. While at one time both repre-
sented locales of oppression for women, more modern understandings
and practices suggest that sex and marriage hold many positive experi-
ences for women as well, thereby complicating the question whether any
choice an adult woman makes ought to be respected regardless of its
consequences. Finally, there is a growing recognition that emotion plays
a significant role in decision-making. This is particularly true for those
decisions we make about intimacy and sexuality. Each of these factors is
played out in Big Love, and each is discussed below as to how they clar-
ify and complicate the question of consent.
A. Lawrence v. Texas
In the first season of Big Love, Roman Grant tells the press that af-
ter the Supreme Court's ruling in Lawrence v. Texas"6 polygamists have
the same rights as homosexuals. Lawrence certainly has the potential to
14. See id. at 249-50.
15. See id. at 2 86-87.
16. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
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make some strange bedfellows"7 because it limits the government regula-
tion of sex and sexuality. Yet, in affirming the right of adults to engage
in private consensual sexual conduct, the United States Supreme Court
made clear that this right is still subject to some limits:
This [liberty interest], as a general rule, should counsel against
attempts by the State, or a court, to define the meaning of the
relationship or to set its boundaries absent injury to a person
or abuse of an institution the law protects. It suffices for us to
acknowledge that adults may choose to enter upon this...
The present case does not involve minors. It does not involve
persons who might be injured or coerced or who are situated
in relationships where consent might not easily be refused. It
does not involve public conduct or prostitution. It does not
involve whether the government must give formal recognition
to any relationship that homosexual persons seek to enter.1
This language attempts to limit Lawrence's reach; while at the same time
opens the door to claims that other private conduct may be protected
within the Constitution's liberty interests beyond the conduct at issue in
the case.
Thus, Lawrence continues to put pressure on both judges and poli-
cymnakers to define those limits. There have been cases in which
defendants have argued that Lawrence prohibits the state from prosecut-
ing, for example, obscenity distribution, 9 adult incest, and
sadomasochism."' Although Lawrence is seen by some as creating a free
market for sexual activity among consenting adults, courts have yet to
agree. No court has articulated a set of guiding principles as to how the
theory of private consensual adult conduct ought to be applied in other
17. See, e.g., Jaime M. Gher, Polygamy and Same-Sex Marriage-Allies or Adversaries
Within the Same-Sex Movement, 14 Wm. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 559 (2008).
18. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567, 578.
19. United States v. Extreme Assocs., Inc., 431 F.3d 150, 161 (3d Cir. 2005) (rejecting
the argument that Lawrence renders federal obscenity law unconstitutional).
20. See Muth v. Frank, 412 F.3d 808, 818 (7th Cir. 2005) (holding that Lawrence "did
not announce a fundamental right of adults to engage in all forms of private consen-
sual sexual conduct.).
21. See State v. Van, 688 N.W.2d 600, 615 (Neb. 2004) (holding Lawrence did not give
defendant a right to engage in sadomasochistic beatings).
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contexts beyond the vague language "injury to a person or abuse of an
institution.,2
From a feminist legal jurisprudence perspective, we might ask
whether the state could justifyr regulating private intimate conduct to
prevent harm to women. Interestingly, in 2004, the Utah Supreme
Court faced this question in State v. Green,"3 a recent case upholding
polygamy prosecutions. In contrast to Lawrence, in which morality was
the state's primary rationale for regulating homosexual sodomy, in the
context of adult consent, Utah argued that both the protection of mo-
nogamous marriage and the protection of women and children justified
the ban on polygamy. The court held,
Utah's bigamy statute serves the State's interest in protecting
vulnerable individuals from exploitation and abuse. The prac-
tice of polygamy, in particular, often coincides with crimes
targeting women and children. Crimes not unusually atten-
dant to the practice of polygamy include incest, sexual assault,
24
statutory rape, and failure to pay child support.
The reasoning in Green suggests that since protecting adult women, as
well as children, is certainly a legitimate, if not compelling, state
22. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567. For an excellent discussion of Lawrence and the question
of consent, see Kimn Shayo Buchanan, Lawrence v. Gedulig: Regulating Women t
Sexuality, 56 EmoRY L.J. 1235, 1238 (2007), which states that "[b]y affirming a right
to sexual autonomy, Lawrence reorients the equal protection analysis." See also Marc
Spindelman, Surviving Lawrence v. Texas, 102 MICH. L. Ray. 1615 (2004); Mary-
beth Herald, A Bedroom of One's Own: Morality and Sexual Privacy After ILawrence v.
Texas, 16 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1, 5 (2004) ("[Whether viewed as a right of liberty
or privacy, the government should not have the authority to interfere with private
adult sexual activities, whether with other consenting adults or as assisted by inani-
mate objects."); Sonia Katyal, Sexuality and Sovereignty: The Global Limits and
Possibilities of Lawrence, 14 Wm. & MAhRY BILL RTs. J. 1429, 1471 (2006) (" [P) rivacy
may be deserving of recognition under Lawrence's protective aegis, but it may necessi-
tate further limitations within the potential confines of the home and other private
spaces, particularly to protect the more vulnerable."); Nelson Lund & John 0.
McGinnis, Lawrence v. Texas and judicial Hubris, 102 MICH. L. Ray. 1555, 1583
(2004) (contemplating whether "something resembling the Playboy Philosophy will
become the official doctrine of the United States"); Mark Strasser, Monogamy, Licen-
tiousness, Desuetude, and Mere Tolerance: The Multiple Misinterpretations of Lawrence
v. Texas 15 S. CAL. Ray. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 95 (2005); John Tuskey, Whats a
Lower Court to Do? Limiting Lawrence v. Texas and the Right to Sexual Autonomy. 21
TouRo L~. Ray. 597 (2005) (examining the limits of Lawrence anid criticizing a broad
application of the holding).
23. Green, 99 P.3d 820.
24. Green, 99 P.3d at 830.
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interest, the state can justify state regulation of intimate relationships.
The court further suggests that a case-by-case analysis would not be
practical as it is often impossible to prosecute polygamy cases because of
the difficulty of reaching our ro its victims.2
Interestingly, while one might attribute the court's concern for
women and children to be a consequence of the heightened awareness of
women's victimization that was aided by feminist jurisprudence, the
United States Supreme Court considered these same concerns when up-
holding Utah's ban on polygamy in 1878 in Reynolds v. United States.2
And while many feminist legal scholars might agree with the court's rea-
soning in Green, at least with respect to concerns about sexual
exploitation and polygamy, one shouldn't ignore the dangerous prece-
dent of paternalism that is implicit in this reasoning. By analogy,
consider Gonzales v. Carhart,2 in which the Supreme Court upheld a
ban on a late-term abortion procedure. In justifying the ban, justice
Kennedy wrote,
'Whether to have an abortion requires a difficult and painful
moral decision. 'While we find no reliable data to measure the
phenomenon, it seems unexceptionable to conclude some
women come to regret their choice to abort the infant life they
once created and sustained. Severe depression and loss of es-
teem can follow.29
Yet, Justice Ginsburg, in a stinging dissent, finds that justifying this ban
on the grounds that women need some special protection is blatant pa-
ternalism. "[Tjhe Court deprives women of the right to make an
autonomous choice, even at the expense of their safety. This way of
25. See e.g., CATHARINE A. MAcKINoN, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: Discouesas ON LIFE
AND LAW 49 (1987).
26. Green, 99 P.3d at 830.
27. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 167-68 (1878) (upholding a charge to the
jury in a polygamy prosecution that considered the social consequences of polygamy
by stating,
I think it not improper, in the discharge of your duties in this case, that
you should consider what are to be the consequences to the innocent vic-
tims of this delusion. As this contest goes on, they multiply, and there are
pure-minded women and there are innocent children,-innocent in a sense
even beyond the degree of the innocence of childhood itself. These are to
be the sufferers. ....)
28. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007).
29. Carhar, 550 U.S. at 159 (internal quotations omitted).
Vol. 17: 11120
thinking reflects ancient notions about women's place in the family and
under the Constitution-ideas that have long since been discredited. "'0
While there are of course many distinctions to be made between
reproductive choices and the regulation of sexuality, this tension in Gon-
zales between protecting women on one hand, and deferring to their
autonomy on the other, is a central tension left unresolved in Lawrence.
It is crucial in a post-Lawrence world for feminist legal theory to be able
to articulate more clearly whether such an interest is in fact compelling
enough to otherwise override individual consent.
B. Conflicting Theories of State Intervention
In addition to demands put on the consent doctrine by Lawrence,
there is a deep and growing tension in feminist theory and legal scholar-
ship about liberalism and the role of the state."' While this debate has
been raging for many decades now in the context of pornography" and
prostitution, 3 it has now become a central tension in domestic violence
law as well. Many scholars have argued that the state should exercise
great restraint before intervening in intimate relationships, even when
30. Carhart, 550 U.S. at 184 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
31. There is a long and rich history of this debate within feminist legal theory, and there
are several examples of this debate. See Kathryn Abrams, Sex Wars Redux:- Agency and
Coercion in Feminist Legal Theory, 95 COLUM. L. Ray. 304, 304 (1995); Robin West,
Desperately Seeking a Moralist, 29 HARv. J.L. & GENDER 1, 1 (2006) (responding to
Janet Halley's critique of the author's book CARING FOR JUSTICE and highlighting
tensions within both feminist and queer theory).
32. For a non-exhaustive literature on feminism and pornography, see ANDREA
DwoRIN, PORNOGRAPHY: MEN POSSESSING WOMEN (1987); MACKINNON, supra
note 25, at 163-97; NADINE STROSSEN, DEFENDING PORNOGRAPHY: FREE SPEECH,
SEX, AND THE FIGHT FOR WOMEN's RIGHTS (1994); Lynn S. Chancer, Feminist Of-
frnses: Defending Pornography and the Splitting of Sex from Sexism, 48 STAN. L. Ray.
739 (1996); Bridget J. Crawford, Toward a Third Wave Feminist Legal Theory: Young
Women, Pornography, and the Praxis of Pleasure, 14 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 99 (2007);
Jennifer C. Nash, Bearing Witness to Ghosts: Notes on Theorizing Pornography, Race,
and Law, 21 WIS. WOMEN's L.J. 47 (2006).
33. Again, while too numerous to list all literature in this area, consider: Margaret A.
Baldwin, Split at the Root: Prostitution and Feminist Discourses of Law Refosrm, 5 YALE
J.L. & FEMINISM 47 (1992); Emily Bernstein, What's Wrong with Prostitution? Whats
Right about Sex Work? Comparing Markets in Female Sexual Labor, 10 HASTINGS
WOMEN's L.J. 91 (1999); Cynthia Chandler, Feminists as Collaborators and Prostitutes
as Autobiographers: De-Constructing an Inclusive yet Political Feminist Jurisprudence, 10
HASTINGS WOMEN's L.J. 135 (1999); Janet Halley et al., From the International to the
Local in Feminist Legal Responses to Rape, Prostitution/Sex Work, and Sex Trafficking:
Four Studies in Contemporary Governance Feminism, 29 HAsw. J.L. & GENDER 335
(2006).
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there is physical violence,3 and leave the decision of state intervention to
the victim.35 These arguments do not explicitly state that individuals
should be able to consent to physical violence. Rather, they articulate
concerns about individual autonomy and decision making,37 pragmatic
concerns about the effectiveness of state intervention," and to some ex-
tent, concerns about protecting privacy." Yet, the practical, if not
theoretical, effect is the same. To argue that individuals should decide if
there should be some state intervention into the relationship is to argue
that individuals have the right to consent to violence, or more broadly,
the right to be in violent relationships even if the state could otherwise
intervene at the victim's request.
In juxtaposition with these arguments are recent developments in
international human rights law. Recently, for example, the European
Court of Human Rights, in Opuz v. Turkey,40 held that a state's failure to
affirmatively intervene in domestic violence cases violated three provi-
sions of the European Convention on Human Rights. The applicant,
Nahide Opuz, claimed that Turkey had failed to protect her and her
34. See, e.g., Sally F. Goldfarb, Reconceiving Civil Protection Orders for Domestic Violence:
Can Law Help End the Abuse Without Ending the Relationship?, 29 CARDozo L. REV.
1487 (2008); Aya Gruber, The Feminist War on Crime, 92 IOWA L. REv. 741 (2007);
Margaret E. Johnson, Redefining Harm, Reimagining Remedies, and Reclaiming Do-
mestic Violence Law, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1107 (2009); Kristian Miccio, A House
Divided Mandatory Arrest, Domestic Violence, and the Conservatization of the Battered
Women's Movement, 42 Hous. L. REv. 237, 239, 264-271 (2005); Jeannie Suk,
Criminal Law Comes Home, 116 YALE L.J. 2 (2006).
35. For an overview of marital rape, see Michelle J. Anderson, Marital Immunity, Intimate
Relationships, and Improper Influences: A New Law on Sexual Offenses by Intimates, 54
HASTINGS L.J. 1465 (2003).
36. For a very interesting discussion that explicitly makes the argument that people
should be able to consent to domestic violence, see, Muse Free, http://
musefree.wordpress.com/2009/03/04/violence-state-and-consent-a-more-lengthy-
discussion/ (Mar. 4, 2009)(arguing that the state should only recognize victimhood if
the victim herself does).
37. See Holly Maguigan, Wading into Professor Schneider's "Murky Middle Ground" Be-
tween Acceptance and Rejection of Criminal justice Responses to Domestic Violence, 11
AM. U. J. GENDER Soc. POL'Y & L. 427, 443-44 (2003) (suggesting that prosecutors
should not adopt no-drop policies, which replace victim decision-making).
38. See Donna Coker, Crime Control and Feminist Law Reform in Domestic Violence Law:
A Critical Review, 4 BUFF. CRIM. L. REv. 801, 806-07 (2001) (noting some potential
benefits of mandatory policies as well as the complexity of the issue, but concluding
that mandatory polices do not strike a good balance between reform efforts and state
power).
39. See Suk, supra note 34, at 66-67 (voicing concerns as to how mandatory state inter-
vention undermine privacy interests).
40. Opuz v. Turkey, App. No. 33401/02, 2009 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, available at
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/4a2f84392.pdf.
122 [Vol. 17:111
mother from her husband."1 The extreme violence they suffered was
brought to the attention of authorities on numerous occasions, but the
state withdrew several criminal prosecutions in part because the two
women withdrew their complaints. Her husband eventually killed her
mother.4" In violating the right to life, the freedom from torture, and the
rights to non-discrimination and equality, the Court held that the state
is required in appropriate circumstances to "take preventive operational
measures to protect an individual whose life is at risk from the criminal
acts of another individual . The Court further explained that the obli-
gation arises when it is established that the state "knew or ought to have
known" of the existence of a "real and immediate risk to the life of an
identified individual from the criminal acts of a third party and that
they failed to take measures within the scope of their powers which,
judged reasonably, might have been expected to avoid that risk.""5
Notably, the government of Turkey raised in its defense that pursu-
ing cases without the victim's willingness
[W/]ould have amounted to a breach of the victims' rights un-
der Article 8 of the Convention, . . . the . .. authorities' view
that no assistance was required as the dispute concerned a
"private matter" was incompatible with their positive obliga-
tions to secure the enjoyment of the applicants' rights.4
Article 8 of the Convention states that:
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and fam-
ily life, his home and his correspondence.
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with
the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance
with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in
the interests of national security, public safety or the eco-
nomic well-being of the country, for the prevention of
disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals,
or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of oth-
47
ers.
41. Opuz, Eur. Ct. H.R. at 1-7.
42. Opuz, Eur. Ct. H.R. at 2.
43. Opuz, Eur. Ct. H.R. at 10.
44. Opuz, Eur. Ct. H.R. at 30.
45. Opuz, Eur. Ct. H.R. at 30.
46. Opuz, Eur. Ct. H.R. at 16.
47. European Convention on Human Rights art. 8, Nov. 4, 1950, Eur. T.S. No. 5.
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Thus, the thrust of the government's argument was that victim pri-
vacy trumped state obligations to ensure her privacy, mirroring, in many
respects, the current disagreement in feminist legal theory over the exer-
cise of prosecutorial discretion when victims either recant or request that
the state not proceed.
The Court rejected this argument. 'While emphasizing the gravity
of the violence perpetrated against the women, the Court nonetheless
found that despite concerns over victim privacy, certain situations re-
quire the state to intervene." Such a duty arises from the obligation to
protect women from private violence within a broader framework of
gender discrimination, particularly as articulated by the Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women."9 The
Court then balances the right to autonomy and decision making against
present and persistent violence, which affects not just the immediate
victim but also the broader interests of public rights.50
'While a similar argument regarding affirmative state duties within a
human rights framework has been made in the aftermath of Town of
Castle Rock v. Gonzales,"1 no American case has suggested that the state
has an affirmative duty to intervene against a victim's wishes.5" In Castle
Rock, the United States Supreme Court held that it was not a violation
of the due process clause for the police to fail to enforce an order of pro-
tection.5" In this case, Jessica Gonzales had a protective order banning
her estranged husband from contacting her or her three daughters. The
husband subsequently kidnapped the children. Gonzales made numer-
ous attempts to get the police to locate her husband and children, but
they did nothing. Later that night, her husband arrived at the Castle
48. Opuz, Eur. Ct. H.R. at 34 ("[T]he more serious the offence or the greater the risk,
the more likely that the prosecution should continue in the public interest, even if
victims withdraw their complaints.").
49. Opuz, Eur. Ct. H.R. at 15 (referencing the Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) and its conclusion that "gen-
der-based violence is a form of discrimination that seriously inhibits women's ability
to enjoy rights and freedoms on a basis of equality with men."). Note that the United
States is not a signatory to CEDAW.
50. Opuz, Eur. Ct. H.R. at 35 ("[Iln some instances, the national authorities' interference
with the private or family ife of the individuals might be necessary in order to protect
the health and rights of others or to prevent commission of criminal acts.").
51. Town of Castle Rockyv. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748 (2005).
52. At least one American court has, however, held that the state may proceed in a case in
which the victim recanted being battered. See People v. Santiago, 2003 WL
21507176 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2003) (allowing the use of the victim's Grand jury testi-
mony and other out-of-court statements to prove First Degree murder charge when
the victim refused to testify, and recanted her prior allegations).
53. Castle Rock, 545 U.S. at 768 (finding that the respondent did not have a property
interest in the enforcement of a restraining order).
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Rock police station and started shooting. After police shot and killed
him, they searched his van and found the bodies of the three children,
whom he had murdered .
Once the Supreme Court ruled in favor of Castle Rock, advocates
appealed the case to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights,
alleging the state's failure to provide her protection specifically violated
the "rights to life, nondiscrimination, family life/unity due process, peti-
tion the government, and the rights of domestic violence victims and
their children to special protections" under the American Declaration on
the Rights and Duties of Man, to which the United States is a signa-
tory.5  The Court granted admissibility of the case,5 and a decision on
the merits is still pending."7
The crucial difference between the two cases is that in Castle Rock,
the petitioner requested state intervention but was denied, while in
Opuz, the petitioner was offered some state intervention but denied it.
While international feminism has embraced a model of affirmative state
duties to intervene in individual cases and political and cultural institu-
tions, American feminism has remained deeply skeptical of state
intervention absent a victims request for state services." This difference
reflects a much deeper division in feminist theory about the effectiveness
and desirability of the state to intervene into womens lives for their own
(paternal isric/maternalisric) protection.
C Changes in Sex and Marrage
Furthermore, there has been a continued shift in how scholars and
society have come to understand the relationship between sex and gen-
der. In feminist theory, there are two schools of thought concerning
54. Castle Rock, 545 U.S. at 753-54.
55. Petition Alleging Violations of the Human Rights of Jessica Gonzales by the United
States of America and the State of Colorado, With Request for an Investigation and
Hearing on the Merits, Jessica Gonzales v. United Stares,(Dec. 23, 2005), available at
https://www.law.columbia.edu/focusareas/clinics/humanrights?exclusive=filemgr.dow
nload&filejid=93473&rtcontentdisposition=filename%3DGonzales Petition.
56. Petition 1490-05 Admissibility, Jessica Gonzales v. United States, 1490-O5 (July 24,
2007), available at https://www.law.columbia.edu/null?&exdusive=filemgr.download
&file-id= 13526&rtcontentdisposition-filena-me%3DAdmissibiliry/o20Decision%20
10.4.07.plf.
57. For a complete history of the case, including links to documents and a video of
Jessica (Gonzales) Lenahan's testimony before the commission, see http://
wwvw.aw.columbia.edu/cener-program/human-rights/InterAmer/GonzalesvUS/G
onzalesvUSMedia (last visited Apr. 29, 20 10).
5 8. See id. at IT5-6.
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intimate relationships. Traditionally, these relationships, particularly
marriage, were understood as a source of repression for women. From
the doctrines of coverture to chastisement, marriage was characterized as
inherently oppressive to women."9 Scholars, notably Catharine
MacKinnon, argued that women's sexuality was inherently coerced
within a culture of rape, drawing attention to the social, cultural, and
legal constructs that subjugated women and made any consent they
might give merely illusory.'
In contrast, many modern scholars have put forth more liberal ar-
guments that characterize state efforts to repress women's sex or
sexuality, or to regulate relationships for their own protection as a denial
of women's individual liberty to decide for themselves their own desti-
612
nies -sometimes referred to as sex-positive feminism. This argument
has been extended to encompass same-sex marriage relationships in
which the denial of the rights and responsibilities of marriage should not
be denied on the basis of sex or sexual orientation. The entire political
and legal agenda to have same-sex relationships decriminalized and
same-sex marriages legally recognized has called into question traditional
feminist theories that marriage is, in itself, a repressive institution. In-
deed, post-Lawrence, the availability of marriage to people regardless of
sexual orientation is a welcome symbol of new equality to many, includ-
ing feminists.
Along with this theoretical liberal shift has been a cultural shift to
what Ariel Levy calls "raunch culture," in which younger women em-
brace sex and sexuality regardless of its degrading or dehumanizing
64
nature in particular contexts . Raunch culture thereby adopts this sense
of what's-good-for-the-goose-is-good-for-the-gander approach to deter-
mining one's sexual choices. To that extent, sexual culture has embraced
a kind of formal equality approach to sexual relationships, either deny-
59. See, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, "The Rule of Love"- Wife Bearing as Prerogative and Privacy,
105 YALE L.J. 2117 (1996).
60. See, e.g., MAcKiNNON, supra note 25.
61. See, e.g., JANET HALLEY, SPLIT DECISIONS: HOW AND WHY To TAKE A BREAK FROM
FEMINISM (2006); Abrams, supra note 31, at 351; Katherine M. Frank, Theorizing
Yes: An Essay on Feminism, Law, and Desire, 10 1 COLUM. L. PEV. 181 (200 1); Susan
E. Stiritz, Cultural Cliteracy:- Exposing the Contexts of Women's Not Coming, 23
BERKELEY J. GENDER, L. & JUST. 243 (2008).
62. See, e.g., Rosaind Dixon, Feminist Disagreement (Comparatively) Recast, 31 I-buy.
J.L. & GENDER 277 (2008); Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132
U. PA. L. Ray. 955, 1019 (1984).
63. Nan D. Hunter, The Sex Discrimination Argument in Gay Rights Cases, 9 J.L. & POL'Y
397 (2001); Deborah A. Widiss et al., Exposing Sex Stereotypes in Recent Same-Sex
Marriage Jurisp rudence, 30 HARv. J.L. & GENDER 461 (2007).
64. ARIEL LEVY, FEMALE CHAUVINIST PIGS AND THE RISE OF PAUNCH CULTURE (2005).
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ing or minimizing the observation that women and men experience sex,
sexuality, and intimate relationships differently. At least some women,
those whom Levy labels "female chauvinist pigs," are now complicit in
the sexual exploitation of other women.6 Yet, young women embrace
this hypersexuality as a symbol of empowerment without fully having
real freedom and real power to embrace a wider range of choices about
their sexuality.'6 Levys observations point to a catch-22 about female sex
and sexuality. It can be both liberating and oppressive, just as marriage
can be both a confining and a liberating institution. And thus, questions
about consent to sex or marriage become complicated for feminist legal
theory because discerning when something is good or bad for women
depends on both subjective and objective understandings; posing a sim-
ple answer seems incomplete and disingenuous.
D. Big Love Redefined
In Big Love, no matter the material or psychic harms that polygamy
has caused Barb, she stays, largely because, as her oldest daughter tells a
friend, her mother loves her father too much. It is love, ultimately, that
explains Barb's choices. This is central to understanding the complex
relationships in Big Love. Yet, the law, neither in theory nor in practice,
does a very good job at understanding the role love plays when we con-
sent to things that may cause us heartache and harm .6  While Lawrence
may affirm a qualified right to consensual sex, and Loving v. Virgini*a 6
may affirm a qualified right to marry someone of the opposite sex re-
gardless of race, there is no unqualified right to "love" in the law.6
65. Id. at 89-117 (describing what she terms "female chauvinist pigs" and how women
themselves participate in the degradation of other women).
66. Id. at 200.
67. See Lynn D. Wardle, All You Need is Love?, 14 S. CAL. REv. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 5 1,
79 (2004) (distinguishing between love as emotion and love as conduct and conclud-
ing that, "All emotional relationships are not equal in terms of stability, constancy,
selflessness, service and fidelity. All emotional relationships do not contribute equally
to the well-being of children or the good of society. just as all emotions are not equal
or equally beneficial, neither are all relationships equal. For the law to mandate the
equality of all emotional relationships is to base public policy on romantic wishes
rather than actual deeds and objective facts.").
68. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
69. See generally Barbara L. Atwell, The Jurisprudence of Love, 85 U. DET. MERcy L. Ray.
495 (2008) (discussing love as a spiritual, not romantic, concept in relation to the
law); Nan Seuffert, Domestic Violence, Discourses of Romantic Love, and Complex Per-
sonhood in the Law, 23 MELB. U. L. REv. 211, 240 (1999) ("[Tlhe common law legal
system has repressed its actual or potential jurisdiction over matters of love and there-
fore has no precedent for hearing statements of romantic love and no framework
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What to do about the role of love in relation to those choices that
we make creates a particular dilemma for feminist legal theory. At the
root of so many of our decisions to be in intimate relationships are the
human desire to love and be loved, and a paradoxical optimism that
things will get better.7 And yet, love can also lead us to make decisions
that may harm us in some way.
Sally Goldfarb makes this point in domestic violence cases. She ar-
gues that the law ought to allow for relationships to remain intact
because, despite the violence, women often do not want these relation-
ships to end .7' Here, Goldfarb implicitly recognizes the autonomy and
self-determination of women to stay with partners, even if those rela-
tionships have, in the past, been marked by violence. This argument is
similar to Jeannie Suk's argument that the criminal law questioning the
imposition of a de facto divorce on couples just because there has been
violence in the relationship.72 While neither scholar specifically discusses
how a victim's expression of love is often at the heart of these decisions
to stay, it is that expression of love that is often the tie that binds one to
another.
In this vein, the concept of romantic love plays a powerfully persua-
sive role in expanding the choices adults can make. Take, for example,
Justice Kennedys language in Lawrence: "At the heart of liberty is the
right to define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the uni-
verse, and of the mystery of human life.",7 1 While Kennedy doest use
the language of love, this language certainly evokes the relationship be-
tween the expression of emotion that leads to intimacy and autonomy.
In this sense, if love is an expression of one's autonomy, then arguably
the law ought to respect the choices made in the context of love. This
represents the beauty of Big Love.
within which to interpret such statements. Paradoxically, the statements also invoke
the spectre of love beyond patriarchal discourses and highlight the common law's lack
of jurisdiction over romantic love.").
70. Kathryn Abrams, Barriers and Boundaries:- Exploring Emotion in the Law of the Family,
16 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 301 (2009); Kathryn Abrams, Legal Feminism and the Emo-
tions: Three Moments in an Evolving Relationship, 28 HARv. J.L. & GENDER 325
(2005).
71. See Goldfarb, supra note 34.
72. Suk, supra note 34, at 66 ("[1] ndividual's choice of intimate partner is so important
that even in the extremely freedom-limiting context of imprisonment, the right to
marry is not extinguished. Protection orders do not formally dissolve a marriage
(though they would prohibit an unmarried couple from marrying). Nevertheless,
state imposed de facto divorce burdens precisely the individual's choice of partner,
which lies at the heart of autonomy in intimate relationships.").
73. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 573 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Ca-
sey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992)).
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But, as Professor Elizabeth Schneider has suggested, romantic love
can also play a powerfully perverse role in "a culture that celebrates [it]
to the extent that ours does[i, shares responsibility for women who have
difficulty protecting their children from the men whom those women
are taught to love. ,'Love, as women in particular are taught to express
it, can also constrain our choices and convince us to suppress our own
autonomy as an act of love for another. Thus, feminist legal theory also
recognizes that there may be instances in which the law ought not re-
spect an individual's expression of love as equivalent to self-
determination. This represents the dangers of Big Love.
III. GENDER AND THE DOCTRINE OF CONSENT
After Lawrence, there are essentially two categories of proscribed
behavior within an intimate relationship to which consent will not alle-
viate the alleged wrongdoer(s) of liability. The first involves those
activities that cause or have the potential to cause serious bodily in-
jury 7 5-what Lawrence describes as "(injury to a person." The second
category is those behaviors that undermine the social order; Lawrence
specifically references public conduct and prostitution. While this cate-
gory certainly suggests that morality alone could serve as the rationale
for state regulation of intimate, sexual conduct, there is an instrumental
quality to the Court's decision that implies that morality alone will not
suffice, but instead suggests that the state must articulate a specific gov-
ernment interest justifying state intrusion into private liberties .7 ' While
the Court does not elaborate on precisely what those state interests
might be, I would suggest that one concern could be that by engaging in
activities such as prostitution, for example, women will corrupt the mo-
rality of men. This section explores both of these categories and argues
that both are very gendered in their history and application.
A. Behavior Proscribed Because It Causes Physical Harm
There are distinctions in legal rules and practices proscribing be-
havior that causes physical harm depending on whether the act takes
74. Katherine K. Baker, Dialectics and Domestic Abuse, 110 YALE L.J. 1459, 1469 (2001)
(reviewing Elizabeth M. Schneider, BATTERED WOMEN AND FEMINIST LAWMAKING
(2000)).
75. See Keith M. Harrison, Law, Order and the Consent Defense, 12 ST. Louis U. PUB. L.
Ray. 477, 478-80 (1993).
76. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
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place in the private or public sphere. In the private sphere, historically,
married men could often chastise their wives without fearing state inter-
vention as long as that chastisement was moderate and did not cause
serious harm. 7 Thus, to the extent that women "consented" to marry,
they also consented to mild chastisement as well as sexual relations with
their husbands .7 ' This practice derived from the legal rule that married
men were responsible for the crimes of their wives, and mild chastise-
ment was acceptable in order to discipline one's wife To that end, by
allowing husbands to use some physical force against their wives, male
privilege is reinforced by denying women autonomous rights.8
The doctrine of consent in the public sphere allowed for people to
consent to sporting activities even though the risk of injury is quite
high, such as in prize fighting and hockey. As Keith Harrison explains,
"(such activity was condoned originally on the theory that the king (or
sovereign) might have a sudden need to raise an army of physically fit
and competitive- minded men to defend against an enemy invasion."8"
Activities that could result in physical harm thereby strengthened men
in their potential service to the state.
Both historically and today, whether the law allows for activity that
could result in physical harm depends largely on the social utility of the
behavior, not the likelihood or severity of the harm itself. Relative to
physical injury in intimate relationships, as a doctrinal matter, the law
no longer recognizes any social utility in allowing one intimate to inflict
injury upon the other since women are now morally culpable for their
own transgressions and because we no longer formally recognize male
superiority. In contrast, there is still much social utility in sport as long
as it is played within certain confined rules.
At the heart of this line-drawing, as I have previously argued, is that
concept of "civilized masculinity. 8 12 The law evolved, and continues to
evolve, to allow for some controlled outlet for male aggression. The rules
of consent historically sought to reinforce a concept of masculinity that
is civilized and controlled. Being a "man"7 meant being in control of
one's spouse and being able to demonstrate one's physical prowess in
77. See, e.g., Bradley v. State, 1 Miss. 156 (1824) (recognizing that husbands could use
moderate chastisement for domestic discipline); Siegel, supra note 59.
78. For an overview of marital rape, see generally Anderson, supra note 35.
79. Cheryl Hanna, Behind the Castle Walls: Balancing Privacy and Security in Domestic
Abuse Cases, 32 T. JEFPERSON L. REv. 65, 69-70 (2009) (discussing the Declaration
of Sentiments and the demands of early feminists to hold married women account-
able for their own crimes as to remove any legal justification for chastisement).
80. Siegel, supra note 59, at 2120.
81. Harrison, supra note 75, at 480.
82. Hanna, supra note 8, at 250.
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competition with other men, but doing so in a controlled and rational
83
Way.
'While the law still allows a great deal of public violence, largely via
sport, it has now formally banned all private violence, thanks in large
measure to the work of feminist legal theorists and activists. Over time,
the law has redefined masculinity and aggression. To some extent, being
a civilized man means that you do not hit women but that you can play
extreme sports as long as you follow the rules of the game.
B. Behavior Proscribed Because It Offends Morality
and the Social Order
Lawrence leaves open the possibility of the state proscribing activity
that could "abuse . .. an institution that the law protects.,, 8 ' This lan-
guage is referring primarily to the protection of heterosexual,
monogamous marriage, but such vague language leaves open the ques-
tion of whether morality alone can justify prohibiting certain consensual
relationships, or whether there must be a more specific argument as to
how a proscribed category of conduct abuses an institution.
But, if we take a closer look at certain well-recognized prohibitions,
such as those that outlaw prostitution," plural marriage,8" and the dis-
tribution of adult obscenity,8 instrumentally, they seek to limit
expressions sexual desire. Specifically, they arguably seek to control
women from sexually arousing men. While we often think of women as
83. Note, for example, in the late 18"f and early 19th centuries, some courts were reluctant
to interfere in private marriages where violence was alleged, as long as that violence
was not severe. One justification for that non-interference was that it would disrupt
the family. Implicit in some of these decisions was the acceptance that men might use
moderate chastisement within the context of marriage. But never did men have carte
blanche to abuse rheir wives. See, e.g, Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U.S. 611, 617-
18 (1910) (holding that a wife had no cause of action for an assault and battery
charge against her husband because it "would open the doors of the courts to accusa-
tions of all sorts of one spouse against the other and bring into public notice
complaints for assaults, slander and libel"); State v. Oliver, 70 N.C. 60, 61 (1874)
(From motives of public policy and in order to preserve the sanctity of the
domestic circle, the Courts will not listen to trivial complaints. If no per-
manent injury has been inflicted, nor malice, cruelty, nor dangerous
violence shown by the husband, it is better to draw the curtain, shut out
the public gaze and leave the parties to forget and forgive.).
84. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567.
85. See infra notes 97-103 and accompanying text.
86. See UTAH CODE ANN., supra note 4.
87. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
20101 RETHINKING CONSENT 131
132 MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF GENDER & LAW [o.1:1
the victims of prostitution, for example, because it is women who are
usually the ones punished, we sometimes fail to see how proscribing
prostitution arguably protects men from falling victim to the power of
female sexuality. It is ultimately male sexual desires that are kept in
check by regulating sex and the women who provide it.
If I have one criticism of Big Love, it is that the show often obscures
the benefits that Bill enjoys from polygamy. The audience is not called
upon to ask how Bill would otherwise satiate his sexual appetite and
remain virtuous but for plural marriage. Bill does lapse in his virtue: first
he lied to his soon-to-be fourth wife Ana about his marital status and
then he had sex with her before their marriage is sealed. But the show
asks us to forgive these transgressions. Ana is irresistible, and Bill does
eventually marry her. The audience is too often invited to feel sympathy
for Bill, who starts to take Viagra. in order to keep up with his sexually
demanding wives, and whose financial obligations to each of his wives
and his children continue to mount. (This reminds me of the Woody
Allen movie Shadows and Fog in which Allens character comes to a
brothel and tells the prostitute, played by Jodi Foster, "I've never paid
for sex in my life." She replies, "Oh, you just think you havent. "88 )
There is a subtle undertone that men are victims of women's sexuality,
whether they know it or not.
That same subtle undertone that men are victims of women's sexu-
ality is also present in the law. In the same way that prohibitions on
violence provide some control over male aggression, prohibitions on
certain sexual relationships provide some control over male lust. Of
course, none of these prohibitions apply solely to one gender in formal
legal doctrine, but it is imperative to recognize the gendered implica-
tions of them.
Yet, even though it is predominately male violence and sexuality
that is controlled through such regulation, arguments against polygamy,
prostitution, and the commercial distribution of obscenity, for example,
focus almost exclusively on the resulting harms such activities have on
women and children .89 Even feminist-inspired arguments in favor of
pornography, 0 prostitution,9' and polygamy, 92 for example, focus on the
resulting benefits legalization would have for women. No one, not even
88. Memorable Quotes for Shadows and Fog (1991), INTERNET MOVIE DATABASE,
http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0 105378/quotes.
89. See, e.g., Green, 99 P.3d at 830. (explaining that prohibition of polygamy protects
women and girls from exploitation).
90. See supra note 32.
91. See supra note 33.
92. See, e.g., Elizabeth Joseph, Polygamy - The Ultimate Feminist Lfstyle, IsLim FOR
TODAY, http://www.islamforroday.comlpolyga-my3.htm (last visited Apr. 28, 2010).
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the most committed libertarians, seriously discusses how such prohibi-
tions infringe upon male liberty. There are no legal scholars arguing how
adult males might be harmed when we deny them the right to plural
marriage or the right to purchase sex. I do not suggest this flippantly.
There is a growing mens rights movement that addresses many legiti-
mate issues, such as parenting discrimination against fathers" and the
high numbers of men who are homeless. 94 But this movement has not
adopted the legalization of prostitution, for example, as social policy
that would improve men's lives.95
Modern controversies about consent continue to focus on argu-
ments about the status of women and rarely ask how legal reforms
would impact men. Take, for example, prostitution, and the recent con-
troversy in Rhode Island. State law banned loitering in public places, so
police could arrest street prostitutes, but it did not ban solicitation it-
self. 96 That left the indoor trade of prostitution untouched because no
loitering is involved. Thus, the private exchange of sex for money was
legal in Rhode Island. Had Elliot Spitzer privately solicited and met
with Ashley Dupr in Providence, for example, no state laws would have
been broken. In 2009, the Rhode Island legislature debated closing this
loophole by criminalizing "indoor" prostitution.
On one side of the debate were feminists, such as Donna Hughes,
who were concerned about trafficking and the sexual exploitation of
women, men, and children who work in the sex industry" It is Dr.
Hughes' position that the institution of prostitution has encouraged
sexual abuse and that there is no way for the state to combat trafficking
93. See, e.g., Michele A. Adams, Framing Contests in Child Custody Disputes: Parental
Alienation Syndrome, Child Abuse, Gender, and Fathers' Rights, 40 F~m L.Q. 315,
321-24 (2006).
94. See, e.g., The National Center for Men, http://www.nationalcenterformen.org-
page3.shtm1d (last visited Apr. 18, 20 10).
95. See, e.g., Men'st Rights Issues, NATIONAL COALITION FOR MEN, http://www.ncfm.org/
?page-id=482 (last visited Apr. 18, 2010) (listing topics including father's rights, false
rape reports, men's health and military conscription, but not rights to engage in legal-
ized prostitution or to distribute pornography).
96. State v. DeMagistris, 714 AN2 567 (R.I. 1998) (holding that state laws only bar
prostitutes from public, not private, solicitation).
97. Cynthia Needham, Bill Targets Loophole in Rhode Island Prostitution Law, PROVI-
DENCE J., Apr. 9, 2009, available at http://www.projo.com/news/content/
PROSTITUTION LOOPHOLE904-09-09 -VDDVTEOv9.3865d13.html.
98. Donna M. Hughes, Donna M Hughes: R. 's Carnival of Prostitution, PROVIDENCE J.,
June 24, 2009, available at http://www.projo.com/opinion/conrributors/content/
CT -nuhughes-06-24-O9AMER5HE v6. 18e5afi6.html.
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absent laws criminalizing prostitution."9 To be sure, the vast majority of
"buyers" in the sex industry are men, while both women and men are
the "sellers." 00 Thus, her argument that criminalization gives law en-
forcement the tools necessary to combat abuses in the sex industry is
premised upon the desire to control men, both in their sexual desires
and in their exploitation of others.'
In contrast, fifty university professors sent a letter opposing the leg-
islation, arguing that there is a difference between coerced trafficking,
on one hand, and willing and consensual sex work, on the other.'02 They
argued that the law should distinguish between outdoor sex workers,
who do experience poverty, homelessness, and other social problems,
and indoor sex workers, who have far fewer such problems, and many of
whom express deep satisfaction in their work.103 Thus, they counseled
that the state should account for such differences rather than use a
monolithic approach. This argument seeks to maximize individual
autonomy and decision making over broader efforts to predominantly
control men in their exploitation of women and children. Rhode Island
chose to go the route of prohibition, and will criminalize all prostitution
as a misdemeanor.
This debate is exactly the Big Love dilemma. In the same way one
can question a meaningful way to distinguish between the exploitative
aspects of the sex industry and at the same time recognize Lawrence's
individual liberty interest to engage in private consensual sexual conduct
that is not the result of coercion, Big Love viewers are invited to ponder
if there is a meaningful distinction between polygamy on the compound
and polygamy in the suburbs. We have to decide if institutions other-
wise so deeply rooted in patriarchy can shed their sexist pasts and
reinvent themselves to be more egalitarian and a source of individual
99. Donna M. Hughes, Legalizing Prostitution Will Not Stop the Harm, Making the Harm
Visible, THE COALITION AGAINST TRAFFICKING IN WOMEN, Feb. 1999, hrrp:l/
www.uri.edu/artsci/wms/hughes/lihvlegal.htm.
100. Norma Horaling & Leslie Levitas-Martin, Increased Demand Resulting in the Flourish-
ing Recruitment and Trafficking of Women and Girls: Related Child Sexual Abuse and
Violence Against Women, 13 HASTINGS WOMEN's L.J. 117, 121 (2002).
101. See Melissa Farley, Prostitution, Trafficking, and CulturalAmnesia: What We Must Not
Know in Order to Keep The Business of Sexual Exploitation Running Smoothly, 18 YALE
J.L. & FEMINISM 109 (2006); Sylvia A. Law, Commercial Sex: Beyond Decriminaliza-
tion, 73 S. CAL. L. Ray. 523 (2000).
102. Press Release, Ronald Weitzer, Professor, George Washington University and &
Elizabeth Ann Wood, Professor, Nassau Community Gollege-SUNY with 50 signa-
tories from the academic community, Letter to Members of the Rhode Island State
Legislature, Re: Prostitution Reform Bflls,(July 31, 2009), available at http://
www.rifuture.orgI50-academics-sign-letter-opposing-ri-prostitution-bills.htm.
103. Id
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human expression. Empirically and philosophically, if we decriminalize,
or even legalize, prostitution and polygamy, it is unclear whether the
women and men most affected by those practices will be better or worse
off. In the same way, if we allow individuals to decide if and how the
state intervenes into relationships marked by intimate partner violence,
it is hard to know whether victims will be safer or will simply trade in
one form of coercion for another.
In all cases, however, if the law were to allow for consent to such
activities, then the consequence would be less legal restraints on men in
the fulfillment of their sexual and aggressive desires. It is particularly
important for feminist legal theory to account for how men's lives will
be impacted by revisiting the consent doctrine. Too often, just as in Big
Love, we fail to appreciate both the benefits and restraints that men ex-
perience when we regulate human sex and aggression. As a result, we
cannot fully appreciate how the law will impact all people's lives.
IV. CONTEMPLATING CONSENT
In Big Love, there is a telling exchange between Bill's second wife
Nicki and her mother. Nicki had previously been sealed to a man when
she was much younger. It is not clear how old she was-perhaps fifteen
or sixteen-but we do know that her parents put her picture and profile
in "The Joy Book," which was used by older men for choosing their
next brides. Nicki, now a mature adult, suggests to her mother that she
did not want to be sealed to her first husband. "Nonsense," her mother
tells her, and recounts Nikki's adolescent excitement as they sewed her
wedding dress. Assuming that Nicki was of legal age when she was mar-
ried (as young as fifteen in some states with parental or court consent 04)
how do we evaluate whether she consented? Do we simply ask if, at the
moment that she said "I do," there was a gun to her head or a pending
threat of physical violence? Do we widen the lens and understand her
consent as acquiescence in a world where her choices were inevitably
limited? Yet, even if we were to rewind the tape, how is the law to evalu-
ate the pressures Nicki faced without completely denying her the
autonomy to make her own decisions, and to accept the consequences of
them?
104. See, e.g., IND. CODE § 31-11-1-6 (2008) (allowing for a female who is at least 15
years of age and pregnant to marry with consent).
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There have been volumes written on the meaning of consent in the
law.""5 The overall consensus has been that the definitions and under-
standing of consent by both courts and legislatures are inconsistent and
largely confused. A number of scholars have proposed theoretical
frameworks for defining consent to capture more fully the complexity of
human behavior. 106 Yet, defining consent in a way that actually reflects
human behavior is nearly impossible because it varies with each situa-
tion and each person. It is simply impossible to capture such a vast range
of experiences into a single legal rule.
That said, there are some observations we might make about the
consent as we both understand and practice it. First, consent is not the
same as choice. While there is no specific legal definition of choice,
common understanding assumes at least two real alternatives and an
affirmative decision among those alternatives. 107 Yet, people rarely enter
into relationships the same way they decide which law school to attend.
We tend to slide into relationships. We acquiesce, we give in, we seek
out, or we agree. We often enter relationships by default rather than by
design. Although the law recognizes a wide range of situations and be-
haviors that constitute consent, we rarely affirmatively say "yes."O
For Barb in Big Love, it is clear that while she consents to the po-
lygamy, it is not of her choosing. That is not to say that individuals do
not exercise agency or autonomy when they consent. For Barb, there is
no threat of physical force that keeps her with Bill. She has financial re-
sources, an education, and an extended family that would welcome her
if she left her husband. Indeed, she once did leave, but returned because
105. For recent scholarship, see Markus Dirk Dubber, Towards a Constitutional Law of
Crime and Punishment, 55 HASTINGs L.J. 509 (2004); Williamn N. Eskridge, Jr., The
Many Faces of Sexual Consent, 37 Wm. & MARYv L. Ray. 49 (1995); Heidi M. Hurd,
Blaming the Victim: A Response to the Proposal that Criminal Law Recognize a General
Defense of Contrihutory Responsihiliiy, 8 BUFF. Glum. L. REv. 503 (2005); Wolfgang
Schomburg & Ines Peterson, Genuine Consent to Sexual Violence Under International
Criminal Law, 10 1 Am. J. INT'L L. 121 (2007); Kenneth W. Simons, The Structural
Concept of Consent in Criminal Law, 9 BUFF. Qum. L. Ray. 577 (2006); Peter Wes-
ton, The Logic of Consent: The Diversity and Deceptiveness of Consent in Criminal Law
(2004); Vera Bergelson, The Right to Be Hurt: Testing the Boundaries of Consent, 75
GEO. WASH. L. Ray. 165 (2007).
106. See, e.g., Bergelson, supra note 105, at 202-36; Eskridge, supra note 105, at 53-67;
Hurd, supra note 105.
107. Merriam-Webster's On-line Dictionary described a "choice" as "a number and va-ri-
ety to choose among, a plan with a wide choice of options." See Merriam-Webster's
On-line Dictionary, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/choice (last visited
Apr. 17. 2010).
108. Lani Guinier, Note, Acquaintance Rape and Degrees of Consent: "No "Means "No, "But
What Does "Yes "Mean?, 117 HA&iv. L. Ray. 2341 (2004) (reviewing the various defi-
nitions; of consent in the context of rape).
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of a complicated set of emotions. Yet, we should not confuse her con-
sent to polygamy with her choice of it.
Second, similar to the way the law looks at domestic violence as a
series of discrete acts instead of an ongoing pattern of behavior, we tend
to think about consent within intimate relationships as a moment in
time-the few seconds before the act in question took place."" Thus, we
often miss the broader context. But we can also understand that consent
is largely contextual, encompassing more than just a few seconds before
the act."0 If we look at cases outside of sexual assault, such as domestic
violence, polygamy, or prostitution, there is no particular moment in
time when we evaluate whether the person has consented. If we take
seriously that coercion negates consent, then it is critical that we rewind
rhe videotape to understand what led up to that moment in time.
If we focus on the moment in time, perhaps Nicki's consent is real.
If we expand our time frame, we have to question, what, if anything, her
consent really means. And, unlike in civil law, in criminal law, there is
no concept of informed consent. When Barb or Nicki or Margene con-
sents to be in a polygamous relationship, they have no idea how doing
so will affect their lives. No one is obligated to tell them of the risks or
benefits, if one could even figure out precisely what those might be.
Thus, when they consent, they also assume a great deal of risk, as the
relationship may not at all be what they bargained for. Of course, this is
true for anyone who enters into any sort of intimate relationship. Rela-
tionships require us to take chances. Sometimes we are hurt or
disappointed or regret our consent. Sometimes we are pleasantly sur-
prised. But in any case, simply saying "she consented" doesn't really tell
us the whole story about what led up to that moment in time when we
say "I do" or when we do not say no.
Even if the law were to provide a definition of consent that cap-
tured the more nuanced nature of our decisions, individuals often
perceive themselves as consenting even if the circumstances suggest oth-
erwise. Sandra Tsing Loh plays with this conundrum wonderfully in her
109. Evan Stark describes how we think of battering in the domestic violence context - a
slap, a kick, a punch, etc. instead of considering the entire context of the relationship.
A similar problem exists in the doctrine of consent. We tend to see it as a "moment
in time." See generally EvAN~ STARK, COaERCIVE CONTROL: How MEN ENTRAP
WOMEN IN PERSONAL LIFE, 12 (2007); Cheryl Hanna, The Paradox of Progress:
Translating Evan Stark's Coercive Control into Legal Doctrines for Abused Women, 15
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 1458 (2009).
110. See, e.g., Schomburg & Peterson, supra note 105, at 138 (detailing that in one inter-
national case, consent as a defense to sexual assault is disallowed "if the victim had
been subjected to violent force, threats of force, or other coercive circumstances such
as detention or psychological oppression").
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article, I Choose My Choice!- The Fruits of the Feminist Revolution? Sister-
hood, Empowerment, and Eight Hours a Day in a Cubicle."' In it, she
reviews Linda Hirshman's book Get to Work ... And Get a Lif, Before It's
Too Late, in which Hirshman takes aim at professional women for opt-
ing out of the workforce to care for husbands and children."' Hirshman
is particularly critical of Gloria Steinman. As Loh describes Hirshmans
attack:
The pliant undercover Bunny shepherded in a "useless choice
feminism" of soft convictions and "I gotta be me" moral rela-
tivism. Hirshman quotes Sex and the City's hapless Charlotte,
who, when given flak for quitting her job to please her smug
first husband, can only wail plaintively, "I choose my choice! I
choose my choice!""'
The main point is that despite Charlotte's insistence that she is choosing
her choice when she drops out of the working world and into the won-
derland of domesticity, she may be compelled to do so out of a deeper
need to please the man she loves.
But as long as we assume that we have autonomy, then to a great
extent, we have autonomy. The sister-wives in Big Love may, at times,
regret their consent, but they do not perceive themselves as being co-
erced or otherwise forced into polygamy. The same is often true for
victims of domestic violence. Even if the circumstances suggest that a
decision not to testify against an abuser, for example, might have been
coerced by abuser, the victim often perceives herself as making her own
decision."' Take, for example, the case of Beverly Johnson, which I have
written about previously:
When I met Ms. Johnson ... she informed me that, despite
the fact that she had suffered abuse throughout the relation-
ship, she did not want to proceed with the [criminal] case. "I
have AIDS," she told me, "and I'm sure that the stress of my
Ill. Sandra Tsing Loh, I Choose My Choice!: The Fruits of the Feminist Revolution? Sister-
hood, Empowerment, and Eight Hours a Day in a Cubicle, ATLANTIC MAG., July-Aug.
2008, available at http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2008/07i-choose-
my-choiceI6847l.
112. Id.
113. Id
114. Cheryl Hanna, No Right to Choose: Mandated Participation in Domestic Violence Prose-
cutions, 109 H-Axv. L. REv. 1849, 1873-74 (1996) (discussing the case of Beverly
Johnson and her desire not to proceed in a domestic violence case); see also Miccio,
supra note 34, at 294 (discussing this same case and criticizing the idea that short-
term autonomy should be sacrificed for long-term equality).
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illness caused him to beat me." She begged me not to pursue
the case because she was afraid that her family would discover
that she had AIDS. She said that she and her boyfriend were
"cworking things out." . ..
Ms. Johnson implored me not to pursue this case. "I'm going
to die soon and I don't want a criminal case to interfere with
my life. You're making things worse, not better." . .. A few
weeks later, she sent me a card, thanking me for respecting her
wishes. She did not mention whether the abuse was continu-
ing.'1
I did not doubt that Ms. Johnson believed that she was "choosing
her choice." Charlotte, the sister-wives, and the battered woman all give
up a great deal to stay in the relationship. All may feel as if they freely
"1consented" to a loss of their autonomy; neither Charlotte, the Sister-
Wives, nor Ms. Johnson may feel coerced or threatened, but rather each
believes that the choice is hers alone to make. But there remains the
normative question of whether such consent is really consent, and
whether from a feminist perspective, such choices ought to be evaluated
as equally "good" for those women to make. Who ought to give mean-
ing and shape to that consent? The consenter herself, or some outside
observer?
It is unlikely that the law will ever abandon an elusive concept of
consent for a more fully informed affirmative choice standard relative to
private intimate relationships. Such arguments have been put forth in
the context of intimate sexual relations, such as the Antioch policy,"'
without much political traction. We resist affirmative standards of con-
sent, in part because they do not necessarily reflect human behavior.
While in the sexual context one might be able to convince a court or
legislature to adopt an affirmative choice policy, doing so in the context
of other currently proscribed activities like prostitution or domestic
abuse would be nearly impossible. Thus, we are left with a deeply imper-
fect definition of consent that, as we shall see, has its own set of
consequences.
115. Hanna, supra note 114, at 1874.
116. Katharine K Baker, Rape, Sex & Shame, 8 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CAmt L. 179, 204-05
(2004-2005).
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V. CASE STUDIES IN CONSENT
In this section, I introduce four case studies that highlight some di-
lemmas posed by allowing for consent to certain intimate conduct. Each
of these cases highlights the difficulties posed by the law and suggests
what consequences might result from an alternative framework. Readers
should be cautioned that I do not necessarily resolve these dilemmas,
but use them to invite some more nuanced discussion about consent. It
is critical in examining these case studies, just as when we view Big Love,
to ask ourselves exactly what it is that the law is seeking to protect in
proscribing certain kinds of intimate encounters. It also important to
ask if there is any principled way to distinguish among the cases pre-
sented. Is physical force or the threat of it the best way to distinguish
between those activities that should be proscribed? Is there a way to
clearly distinguish between sex and violence? Should we always allow for
consent in all cases, leaving it to the alleged victim to decide whether she
or he wants state intervention? Does it matter if the relationship is an
intimate partnership or a fleeting commercial exchange? These cases
help to illustrate these dilemmas. Like viewers of Big Love, feminist legal
theorists may answer these questions differently, albeit no less sincerely.
A. R v. Emmett: Behavior That Falls Between Sex and Violence
The first case, which I have written about before, involves sado-
masochistic sex (S&M) within the context of an intimate relationship.
Even though the case originates in England, the fact pattern highlights
this Big Love dilemma relative to consent in American law as well. In R
v. Emmett,"17 a heterosexual couple lived together. The defendant was
charged with assault and battery. The case came to the attention of the
authorities after the victim's doctor reported that one of his patients had
received injuries that caused him grave concern."' There were two inci-
dents that gave rise to this concern. In the first, Emmett placed a plastic
bag over his partner's head, tied it at the neck, and tightened it to the
point where she could no longer endure the pain."' This is known an
erotic asphyxiation and is intended to heighten sexual pleasure. While
he was performing sexual acts on her, she lost consciousness. She lived,
117. R v. Emmett, 1999 E.W.C.A. 2651 (June 18, 1999) [hereinafter Emmett], available
at http://a-level-law.com/caselibrary/R%/20v%/2OEMMETT%/20%/5BI 999%/5D%/
20LTL%20AC9600065%20-%20CA.doc.
118. See Emmett, E.W.C.A. 2651 at 9191l 5-6.
119. See Emmett, E.W.C.A. 2651 at 919 5-6.
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but suffered hemorrhages in both eyes and bruising caused by lack of
oxygen. A few weeks later, she returned to the doctor. The defendant
had poured lighter fluid on her and lit it-again to heighten her sexual
pleasure. She suffered a burn to her breast that became infected. Because
she sought immediate medical help, she had no permanent scarring. I
The defendant admitted that it was his idea to engage in this activity
but argued that it was consensual. As the case was pending, the couple
got married and she was able to claim marital privilege and refused to
testify'.
The question before the court was whether to allow consent as a
defense to the assault and battery charges. 121 The court presumed con-
sent to the sexual activity, but the court considered this more than just a
sexual encounter; there was a violent encounter that resulted in serious
injury. 1 2 The court found that consent was irrelevant, and based on the
defendant's own statements, and those of the doctor, he was convicted
and received a suspended sentence. 2 1
The appellate court rejected Emmett's argument, relying on a 1993
House of Lords decision, R v. Brown.12 1 In that case, the House of Lords
refused to allow consent as a defense to sadomasochistic acts that took
place at a nightclub frequented by the gay community. 2 1 In Regina, the
defendants engaged in a range of behaviors including maltreatment of
genitalia (with, for example, hot wax, sandpaper, fish hooks, and nee-
dles) and ritualistic beatings either with the assailants' bare hands or a
variety of implements, including stinging nettles, spiked belts, and a
cat-o'-nine-tails. 26 There were instances of branding and infliction of
injuries that caused bleeding and left scarring. The infliction of pain was
subject to certain rules including "code words" that would communicate
to the sadist to stop if the pain became unbearable. The activities took
place in a highly controlled and private setting, instruments were
120. See Emmett, E.W.C.A. 2651 at 11.
12 1. Emmett, E.W.C.A. 2651 at It13
(Where two adult persons consent to participate in sexual activity in pri-
vate not intended to cause any physical injury but which does in fact cause
or risk actual bodily harm, the potential for such harm being foreseen by
both parties, does consent to such activity constitute a defence to an allega-
tion of assault occasioning actual bodily harm contrary to section 47 of the
Offences Against the Person Act 1861?).
122. Emmett, E.W.C.A. 2651 atr 3.
123. Emmett, E.W.C.A. 2651 at 129.
124. Regina, 1 A.C. 212. For a description of the case, see BILL THOMPSON, SADOMASO-
CHISM: PAINFUL PERVERSION OR PLEASURABLE PLAY? 1- 13 (1994).
125. Regina, 1 A.C. at 212.
126. Regina, I A.C. at 236.
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sterilized, and none of the participants sought medical attention.127 The
police raided the club and arrested some of those people who were in
the role of the sadist. In that decision, the House of Lords ruled:
In principle there is a difference between violence that is inci-
dental and violence that is inflicted for the indulgence of
cruelty. The violence of sadomasochistic encounters involves
the indulgence of cruelty by sadists and the degradation of vic-
tims. Such violence is injurious to the participants and
unpredictably dangerous. I am not prepared to invent a de-
fense of consent for sado-masochistic encounters which breed
and glorify cruelty...
Society is entitled and bound to protect itself against a cult of
violence. Pleasure derived from the infliction of pain is an evil
thing. Cruelty is uncivilized. 128
Regina was appealed to the European Court of Human Rights
(ECHR), which unanimously upheld the decision."2 ' In doing so, the
ECHR rejected the defendant's argument that the state had interfered
with their right to respect for their private lives under the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms.'" 0 Rather, even assuming that the acts were private, the court
likened the activities of the defendants to acts of torture. The court
found that the state was entitled to regulate activities involving the in-
fliction of physical harm, whether they "occurred in the course of sexual
conduct or otherwise."13'. The ECHR maintained that these were not
trifling or transient injuries. 132 It found that the state had prosecuted not
based on the defendants' sexual orientation or proclivities, but on the
extreme nature of the practices themselves. 133 The court was clear that it
did not need to reach the issue as to whether the state could regulate the
activity based on moral grounds; it found sufficient social utility reasons
to let the decision stand.13 1
127. Regina, 1 A.C. at 236, 245.
128. Regina, 1 A.C. at 236-37.
129. Laskey v. United Kingdom, (1997) 24 Eur. Ct. H. R. 39.
130. Laskey, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 39.
131. Laskey, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 58.
132. Laskey, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 59.
133. Laskey, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 59.
134. Laskey, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 60.
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The Emmett court followed similar reasoning, finding no distinc-
tion between Regina and the present case." It refused to privilege the
activities merely because they took place in private and found that the
injuries were significant enough to warrant state intervention.3 16 Interest-
ingly, the rulings in both Emmett and Regina foreshadow the ECHR's
decision in Opuz v. Turkey, where the court also found that the preven-
tion of physical harm outweighs any liberty interests, and thus not only
justifies state intervention but also compels it.'3 7
Of course, we have no way of knowing whether the "victimn! in
Emmett was an enthusiastic participant or whether she was forced or
coerced into the S/M encounters or whether she was afraid to come
forward. But she married and stayed with Emmett-perhaps out of fear,
or, perhaps out of -Big Love for him. It is simply impossible to know
unless she herself tells us, and even then, she may be very conflicted over
her "consent."
Let's further assume that from a feminist perspective, at least, the
law should have two simultaneous goals: the first is to protect liberty
and autonomy, and the second is to promote gender equality; and that
these goals are not mutually exclusive. 318 On one hand, it can be argued
that in this context, the claim that the harm was part of a sexual en-
counter was just a guise for exploitation. The harms she suffered were
serious, and absent state intervention, men will use the S&M context to
inflict harm upon their intimate partners. While arguably paternalistic,
the victim needs to be protected even if she herself doesn't recognize the
harm. Given that the defendant claimed that the S&M was his idea, we
can assume that while his partner might have consented, she did not
choose what happened to her. Furthermore, how could she possibly ex-
ercise individual autonomy if she is subject to what amounts to torture?
From this perspective, she suffers a human rights violation if the state
doesnkt prosecute her husband.
In contrast, a more libertarian-informed perspective might argue
that individuals, including women, have the right to consent to relation-
ships that may cause them physical harm. Furthermore, because the acts
135. Emmett, E.W.C.A. 26511 29.
136. Emmett, E.W.C.A. 2651 at 91f 31.
137. Opuz, Eur. Ct. H.R. 1.
138. For discussion of sadomasochism from feminist perspectives, see Maneesha Deckha,
Pain, Pleasure, and Consenting Women: Exploring Feminist Responses to SIM and Its Le-
gal Regulation in Canada Through Jelinek's The Piano Teacher, 30 HARv. J.L. &
GENDER 425 (2007); Vanessa E. Munro, Constructing Consent: Legislating Freedom
and Legitimating Constraint in the Expression of Sexual Autonomy, 41 AKRON L. Ray.
923 (2008); Monica Pa, Beyond the Pleasure Principle: The Criminalization of Consen-
sual Sadomasochistic Sex, 11I Tax. J. WOMEN & L. 51 (2001).
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took place within the context of sexual activity intended to heighten
pleasure, arguably she has a right to seek and receive such pleasure. If
she asks for state intervention, claiming she did not consent, the state
should intervene. If she is hostile or indifferent, we should defer to her
Silence, thus maximizing her autonomy and preserving her privacy, and
providing her with the same rights men have historically enjoyed to en-
gage in controlled, violent activities purely for pleasure.
I generally have preferred the former argument to the latter, largely
on pragmatic concerns that at the very least, the criminal prosecution
puts the defendant on notice that even if she consented to the activity,
he has to exercise more caution and control. Given the level of danger
involved, it was preferable to reinforce that if he plays with fire and
someone is burned, he is responsible. But I also acknowledge that this
argument may not give adequate weight or consideration to either the
privacy or liberty interests of the woman involved and may damage
women's overall autonomy when the state proceeds against her wishes.
Forbidding consent to private activities that carry with it the high
likelihood of physical injury is a relatively easy line for the law to draw.
Unlike consent to physical violence in the public sphere where third-
party intervention is more likely, private violence has an increased risk
that one person will get carried away and cause injury beyond that
which was contemplated."' 9 Categorical prohibitions further avoid a
case-by-case inquiry into consent, thereby avoiding a legal quagmire that
also invites uncertainty and possibly more state intervention into private
intimate relationships in the search for what consent really means.
But, in that same way Big Love asks us to honor the choices the sis-
ter-wives have made, perhaps we should honor Mrs. Emmett's decision
to reject state intervention into her private life. Apart from the empirical
questions as to whether such intervention actually makes a positive dif-
ference in her life (how do we even measure this?), shouldn't the law
assume her to be an autonomous decision maker who has the right to be
in a relationship of which the objective viewer might disapprove? Absent
evidence of force or coercion, shouldn't we treat her as an adult capable
of making decisions for herself? Rather than assume that she is a victim,
we should assume she is not.
This is an honest and real debate for feminist legal theory: those
who would argue on either side can all legitimately claim to be on the
side of gender equality. What this case, and those to follow, help to illus-
trate is that no matter which argument the law preferences, the
consequences for womens equality are both imperfect and uncertain. It
139. See Regina I A.G., at 911 39 (Lord Jauncey) ("[11t would appear to he good luck rather
than good judgment which has prevented serious injury from occurring.").
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is both the complexity of the problem and its ambivalence, which that is
at the heart of the future of feminist theory.
B. People v. Brown: Behavior Proscribed Because
It Could Cause Physical Harm
The second case, People v. Brown, 140 involves football legend Jim
Brown and his wife Monique. He was 61 when they married; she was
23. One night in 1999, the police received a call to their residence. The
police testified that Monique met them outside her house and told them
that after a heated argument, her husband threatened he would kill her
by snapping her neck and that he told her he had a gun in the house.141
To get away from him, she went into their garage, Brown followed and
then picked up a shovel and began beating her car. Afraid, she fled to a
neighbor's house. 4'Brown was arrested and charged with terrorist
threats and vandalism. Monique did state that there had been other in-
cidents of domestic violence, but that this was the first time she had
contacted the police. 11 She did not want the case to go forward, but the
prosecution insisted.
Before trial, the couple made an appearance on Larry King Live,
and Brown admitted to having hit women in the past. Indeed, he had
been arrested at least five times for violence against women. But he de-
nied threatening Monique. He said:
I don't want to play the race card. I don't want to play the in-
dependent black man. I don't want to play that particular
game. But it is a fact in this country that all over this country
policeman have been killing people for having screwdrivers in
their hands. There has been brutality in New York. There are
cases all over this country wherein African-Americans and La-
tinos are being harassed. I'm not blatantly saying that every
policeman is against me or against the black community. I am
saying that the black community have no trust in law en-
forcement. 144
Brown claimed that he was suffering from depression over the loss
of a friend, which was why the fight had started.
140. People v. Brown, 96 Cal. App. 4th Supp. 1 (200 1) [hereina-fter Brown].
141. Brown, 96 Cal. App. 4th Supp. at 7.
142. Brown, 96 Cal. App. 4th Supp. at 7.
143. Brown, 96 Cal. App. 4th Supp. at 7-8.
144. Larry King Live (CNN television broadcast Aug. 4, 1999).
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Monique blamed herself for the incident. At trial, she defended her
husband and introduced expert testimony that she had personality and
medical issues that caused her to overreact and escalate the incident.'
The jury rejected the threat charge and found him guilty of vandalism.
When Brown refused to attend mandatory domestic violence counsel-
ing, the judge sentenced him to six months in jail.146 The court rejected
the defense that Monique had consented to the smashing of her car.
Brown spent four months in prison after an appeals court rejected his
argument that the sentence was retaliatory. 1 7
Commentators such as Linda Mills have argued that the state
should not have proceeded in this case because it put Monique in an
impossible position. 48 She chose to protect her husband rather than her-
self, and the state should respect her decision.'4"
We might even take Mills' argument one step further and argue
that the State's decision to proceed with the case forced Monique to lie
and degrade herself publicly, as well as subject herself to perjury
charges.50 NWile scholars like Mills locate the dilemma in prosecution
policies,"5' there is also a dilemma posed by the unavailability of consent
as a defense to the threat charge. If the law allowed Brown to invoke
consent as a defense to the charges, then Monique could be honest and
say, "es, he threatened and scared me, but I accept that behavior." It is
not necessary that she consent at the moment in time of the alleged as-
sault. Rather, were we to think about consent more broadly as
acceptance rather than affirmation, and within a broader time frame,
she's willing to "Put up with it" because she values the relationship de-
spite any risks herself. She is in Big Love with her husband. Similar to
145. Brown, 96 Cal. App. 4th Supp. at 773.
146. Brown, 96 Cal. App. 4th Supp. at 742-43.
147. Jessica Blanchard, Jim Brown Leaves jail After Serving Reduced Sentence, L.A. TIMES,
July 4, 2002, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2002jul/04/local/me-jim4;
Margaret Talev, 2 Weeks Into His jail Sentence, Jim Brown is Still Not Eating, L.A.
TIMES, Mar. 29, 2002, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2002/mar/29/
locallme-brown29.
148. LINDA G. MILLS, INSULT TO INjuRY: RETHINKING OUR RESPONSES TO INTIMATE
ABUSE (2003).
149. Id.; see also Annalise Acorn, Surviving the Battered Readers Syndrome, Or: A Critique
of Linda G. Mills'Insult to Injury: Rethinking Our Responses to Intimate Abuse, 13
U.C.L.A. WOMEN'S L.J. 335, 341-50 (2005) (reviewing and criticizing Mills' re-
sponse to this case is derail).
150. For a broader discussion of these issues, see Njeri Mathis Rutledge, Turning A Blind
Eye: Perjury in Domestic Violence Cases, 39 N.M. L. Ra'.. 149 (2009).
151. For a critique of mandatory interventions in domestic violence cases, see Miccio,
supra note 34.
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Barb's acceptance of Bill's polygamy, Mon ique does not choose Jims an-
ger and aggression towards her, but she consents to it.
Many domestic violence victims recant what happened when the
state decides to proceed with the case."' 2 They often claim the injuries
happened accidentally, or like Monique, blame themselves. Others sim-
ply distrust the judicial system more than they distrust their partners."
Theoretically, were the law to recognize consent as a defense, it would
allow victims to tell the truth and say, "Yes, he threatened me, or kicked
me, or hit me. But I accept that as part of the consequence of being in
this intimate relationship." This argument assumes that Monique is not
being coerced or controlled by her husband, but is able to make her own
decisions when faced with imperfect choices. In both this case and Em-
mett, we do not know if the man in the relationship controls his partner
through a series of coercive tactics, or whether these were isolated inci-
dents. Similar to a liberal-feminist critique of Emmett, we assume that
Monique is not a victim until she herself tells us she is, or until thle state
has better evidence of an ongoing pattern of coercion that robs the
woman of her autonomy.15
Let me be clear: I am not necessarily convinced (yet) by this argu-
ment. Indeed, I am very skeptical of allowing consent to be a defense to
assault and battery in the context of an intimate sexual relationship.
Even if the law of consent remains the same, however, prosecutorial po-
lices that allow victims to decide whether a case should be prosecuted
are the functional equivalent of recognizing consent as a defense to as-
sault and battery and other related crimes of physical aggression. But,
even though I am not convinced that victims themselves ought to have
the final say in these cases, to be honest about the theoretical and practi-
cal effects of our decision to preference personal autonomy over other
state interests, including physical safety, is helpful to the debate. To
some extent, I agree with Mills that people should not have to choose
between truth and autonomy, nor should there be legal rules that en-
courage people to lie. One consequence of the consent doctrine is that it
does not allow victims to be completely forthcoming about their
152. Tom Lininger, Prosecuting Batterers After Crawford, 91 VA. L. Ray. 747, 768 (2005)
("Victims of domestic violence are more prone than other crime victims to recant or
refuse to cooperate after initially providing information to the police. Recent evidence
suggests that 80 to 85 percent of battered women will recant at some point."); see also
Douglas E. Beloof & Joel Shapiro, Let the Truth Be To/l: Proposed Hearsay Exceptions
to Admit Domestic Violence Victims' Out of Court Statements As Substantive Evidence,
I1I COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 1, 3 (2002) (describing non-cooperation by recantation
and failure to appear as "an epidemic in domestic violence cases").
153. Gruber, supra note 34, at 815-17.
154. See STp.ARK, supra note 109.
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decisions and treats them in a monolithic way as being incapable or
pathological, rather than rational in their decision-making.
I should note that Jim and Monique Brown still appear to be to-
gether after a decade, and there have been no further press reports of
calls to the police. Of course, we do not know if that indicates that there
has been no further violence, or if Monique is afraid to have the state
intervene because she fears the negative publicity and the loss of control
over the process. We also do not know if Brown continues to coerce and
threaten her, if she fears for her safety were she to call the police, or if
the criminal prosecution has deterred his violence. Therefore, just as in
the previous case, legal decision makers are left to speculate about the
true nature of her consent and her safety, and whether a change in the
law or the way we practice it might best achieve the simultaneous goals
of equality and autonomy.
C State v. Brian Rooney:
Behavior Proscribed Only if There Is No Consent
The next case I discuss, State v. Brian Rooney, is one that I wit-
nessed unfold first-hand in my community. I include it in this
discussion because it highlights the relationship between the doctrine of
consent, privacy, and the possible unintended consequences of expand-
ing the consent doctrine.
During parents' weekend at the University of Vermont, a college
student named Michelle Gardner Quinn went missing after a night out
with friends in Burlington, Vermont. A few weeks later, her body was
discovered in a local gorge."' 5 She had been anally raped and then bru-
tally killed.'
Michelle had gotten separated from friends that evening when
Brian Rooney, a thirty-seven-year-old construction worker, saw her
struggling with her dead cell phone. Rooney approached her and offered
his cell phone. Rooney was caught on a surveillance tape walking with
Michelle, so he was easily identified as a possible suspect in her disap-
pearance and murder. Evidence against Rooney began to unfold,
including a DNA match, and statements that he made to police in
155. Brian Joyce, Body of Missing LIVMv Student Found, WCAX, Oct. 13, 2006, http:/
www.wcax.com/Global/story.asp?s=5535894.
156. Adam Silverman, Day Four Proceedings Cancelld, BURLINGTON FREE Pm~s, May 16,
2008, available at http://www.burlingionfreepress.com/article/20080516/NEWSO1I/
8051 5048/Day-4-proceedings-cancelled.
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which he said, "If I did it, I deserve to die."' A jury convicted Rooney
and sentenced him to life in prison."' 8
In the course of the investigation into Michelle's death, it was dis-
covered that Rooney had also sexually assaulted other women with
whom he had been romantically involved.5 9 According to at least one
affidavit, Rooney allegedly drugged a former girlfriend and anally raped
her on numerous occasions.'6 He had done this to other women as
well.' 6'
This young woman, identified as A.S. in court documents, met
Rooney when she was only seventeen and he was thirty-one. The two of
them eventually had a child together. During the course of their rela-
tionship, he sexually assaulted her as often as three times a week. 162 A.S.
eventually requested a temporary restraining order against Rooney after
she discovered he was seeking someone to kill her.' At the hearing for
the permanent order, no witness appeared to corroborate that story, so
the court asked if there was another reason she would need a restraining
order.' When she told the court about the sexual abuse, Rooney
claimed that all the sex was consensual and that he had videotapes and
pictures to prove that she liked what he did to her. 165 It is not clear from
the affidavit if the judge was willing to allow him to introduce the tapes
and ~photographs, but the court denied the final abuse of prevention or-
der.6
After Michelle's murder, when police discovered that Rooney had
allegedly attempted to solicit someone to kill A.S. '16 ' he was also charged
with a felony for inciting murder for hire as well as other counts of
157. John Curran, Murder Suspect: "If I Did It, I Deserve to Die", ASSOCIATED PRESS, May
21, 2008 available at http://findarticles.com/p/news-articles/virginia-n-pilot-ledger-
star-norfolk/mi_8014/is_20080 522/slaying-suspect-told-officer-tape/ai-n 4 1402391/.
158. Rooney Convicted of Killing Michelle Gardner-Quinn, WCAX, May 22, 2008, http:/l
www.wcax.com/global/story.asp?s=83 65 117.
159. Sam Hemingway, Legal System May Change After This, BURLINGTON FREE PRESS,
Oct. 26, 2006, at Al.
160. Sam Hemingway, Rooney's Violent Past, BURLINGTON FREE PRE~SS, Oct. 22, 2006, at
Al.
161. Chittenden Unit for Special Investigations Affidavit of Probable Cause VSP, at 1 16,
State v. Rooney, No. 06AI04828 (Oct 18, 2006).
162. Id. at T9.
163. Id. at It 15.
164. Id. at 17.
165. Id. at 17.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 22-23.
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sexual assault. These charges were dropped after the guilty verdict in the
murder case. 168
Of course we do not know if granting a restraining order or prose-
cuting Rooney for nonconsensual sex with A.S. would have stopped him
from raping and killing Michelle, but some in the legal community be-
lieved that taking claims of sexual abuse more seriously was necessary to
protect victims.'
A.S. claimed that she stayed in the relationship with Rooney be-
cause, "He was my first and I wanted to be with him. I really loved
him."70 She believed that he would change."7 ' Yet, despite those state-
ments, I would suggest that A.S.'s decision to stay with Rooney was not
a result of Big Love-but big fear. In what can only be described as a
moment of some poetic justice, A.S. testified at Michelle's trial that
Rooney was intimately familiar with the gorge where her body was
found, having frequented it regularly. This evidence was particularly
damaging to Rooney. Yet, despite the fact that A.S. was now safely away
from Rooney, I never saw a woman look more terrified than when she
testified against him. I couldn't help but believe that it was terror, not
love, that bound her to Rooney.
Despite A.S.'s own "consent" to stay with Rooney and endure the
abuse, nothing about her decision to stay evinced any autonomy or con-
sent. But the mere availability of consent to sexual acrivity was enough
to discourage her from seeking further legal help. Unlike assault and
battery, rape and sexual assault allow for consent as a defense. 7 7' Had
Rooney hit her, consent would have been irrelevant and the court might
have taken her claims of abuse more seriously. There would have been a
greater possibility that the state would be able to exercise some control
over him. But, because his violation was primarily sexual, he had the
168. Adam Silverman, State Drops Rooney Charges, BURLINGTON FREE PREaSS, Nov. 4,
2008, at Bi.
169. Hemingway, supra note 159, at Al.
170. Chittenden Unit for Special Investigations, supra note 161, at 9119.
17 1. Id.
172. See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13 § 3252 (20 10), noting that under the Vermont statute
for sexual assault:
(a) No person shall engage in a sexual act with another person and compel
the other person to participate in a sexual act:
compel the other person to participate in a sexual act:
(1) without the consent of the other person; or
(2) by threatening or coercing the other person; or
(3) by placing the other person in fear that any person will suffer imminent
bodily injury
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right to claim that she agreed. Ironically, Rooney had told A.S. that he
would never hit a woman because he saw his father abuse his mother.'
He himself did not see sexual abuse as the same as physical abuse in the
same way that the law differentiates between the two. It is this he
said/she said dilemma in the context of sexual assault cases involving
intimate partners that makes the prosecution of such crimes so difficult,
particularly when there is no physical violence outside of the sexual ac-
tivity involved. Yet, it is undeniable that A.S.'s victimization was no less
significant than if Rooney had only physically abused her and that the
impact on her autonomy and self-determination just as significant as if
were she beaten and not raped.
This case also sends cautionary tale: once the law allows for consent
to be a defense to assault and battery, for example, then women will of-
ten be deterred from seeking outside help. Even though A.S. tried to
seek help, the public humiliation of having her sex life on trial was likely
enough to deter her from pursuing help.17 1 And, this case reminds us
that perpetrators of violence rarely have a single victim. While the law
may privilege an individual woman's choice to consent, how does it pro-
tect the next woman who does not consent? More than a decade of
experience with these questions has left us no closer to the answers.
D. United States v. Extreme Associates: Behavior Proscribed Because It
Offends Moraity and the Social Order
In 2002, the PBS series Frontline produced a documentary called
American Porn.' 5 It explored the multibillion dollar pornography indus-
try. It was subtitled, "It's a multibillion dollar business-and growing. In
a wired world, can anything stop it?" During the filming of the docu-
mentary, PBS producers interview Rob Zicari, owner of Extreme
Associates, a company that claimed to produce some of the most hard-
core pornography available. During the filming of American Porn, the
producers were so shocked by the simulated rape and murder scenes of
women that they left the set. During the filming, Zicari challenged then
173. Chittenden Unit for Special Investigations, sup ra note 161, at 15.
174. Douglas E. Beloof, Enabling Rape Shield Procedures Under Crime Victims' Constitu-
tional Privacy Rights, 38 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 291, 299 (2005) ("The anti-rape
movement confronts, as it must, the cultural myths that uniquely exist in the context
of rape. Manipulation of these myths, along with humiliation and victim blaming,
are typical informal defenses to rape charges. Blaming victims in rape cases may be an
effective means to secure acquittal.").
175. Frontline: American Porn (PBS television broadcast Feb. 7, 2002), available at http:ll
www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/porn/.
20101 151
MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF GENDER & LAW
Attorney General Ashcroft by claiming that he would likely be the test
case on obscenity.'76 Ashcroft decided that if anyone could stop such
pornography, it would be him. In 2003, Zicari and his wife and co-
owner Janet Romano were charged with violating federal obscenity
laws.17' This was the first federal obscenity prosecution in a decade. 7 1
The couple appealed the indictment, arguing that the right to pri-
vacy, then recently strengthened by the Court's opinion in Lawrence v.
Texas, gave individuals the right to view obscene material.'79 That right
was unconstitutionally burdened, they argued, by federal laws banning
distribution of such material.so The District Court agreed, declaring
that the federal anti-obscenity laws were unconstitutional.'"' However,
the Third Circuit reversed, holding that because only the Supreme
Court itself could overrule precedent, it could not extend the right of
privacy under Lawrence to include the distribution of obscenity.82 The
Supreme Court denied the couple's petition for certiorari.' The couple
pled guilty and each received a sentence of a year and a day.
At the heart of Extreme Associate's argument was that individual
privacy interests can not be infringed upon simply because the govern-
ment is attempting to regulate sexual morality.' In contrast, Mary Beth
Buchanan, the U.S. Attorney for the Western District of Pennsylvania,
where the case was prosecuted, and who once served as the acting direc-
tor of the Justice Department's Office on Violence Against Women,
said, after Zicari and Romano pled guilty, "This case affirms that no
matter who you are, or where you are, certain abhorrent behavior simply
violates our community's standards."'. It was her position that such im-
176. Interview with Rob Black of Extreme Associates, in Frontline: American Porn,
supra note 175, available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/porn/
interviews/black.html.
177. News Release, Mary Beth Buchanan, U.S. Attorney for the W. Dist. of Pa., Aug. 7,
2003 (on file with author), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/ceos/
Press%20Releases/WDPA%20Zicari%20indict%20PR_080703.pdf-
178. Id.
179. United States v. Extreme Assocs., Inc., 352 F. Supp. 2d 578, 586 (W.D. Pa. 2005).
180. ExtremeAssocs., 352 F. Supp. 2d at 596.
181. ExtremeAssocs., 352 F. Supp. 2d at 595-96.
182. United States v. Extreme Assocs., Inc., 431 F.3d 150, 161 (3d Cir. Pa. 2005).
183. Extreme Assocs., Inc. v. United States, 547 U.S. 1143, 1143 (2006).
184. Grant Gross, Couple Gets Prison Time for Internet Obscenity, IDG NEWS SERVICE,
July 3, 2009, http://www.pcworld.idg.com.au/article/309771/couple-getsprison-
time_internetobscenity.
185. See Brief of Defendants-Appellees at 13-14, United States v. Extreme Assocs., Inc.,
431 F.3d 150, No. 05-1555 (3rd Cir. May 12, 2005).
186. Press Release, U.S. Attorney's Office of W. Dist. of Pa., Extreme Associates and Its
Owners, Robert Zicari and Janet Romano, Plead Guilty to Violating Federal Obscenity
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ages degrade society, particularly women-the same arguments put forth
by Catharine MacKinnon and Andrea Dworkin a generation earlier.187
The debate over obscenity is doctrinally framed as free speech ver-
sus government censorship.88' But we might also consider it as one that
raises questions about consent and state intervention. The actresses in
Zicari's films consent to be filmed. Indeed, his wife, whose screen name
is Lizzie Borden, often was the star of Zicari's productions. Acting in
pornography is generally legal, as most courts that have examined the
issue have held that acting in pornography is not the same as prostitu-
tion."'9 The actors are being compensated for their craft, not the sex
itself.90
Laws, REUTERS, Mar. 11, 2009, avajiable at http://www.reuters.com/articlel
pressRelease/idUS20663O+1 1-Mar-2009+PRN2009031 1.
187. DwoRKIN, supra note 32; MACKINNON, supra note 25.
188. See Miller, 413 U.S. at 25 (1973) (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489
(1957)) (defining the test for obscenity as "(a) whether 'the average person, applying
contemporary community standards' would find that the work, taken as a whole, ap-
peals to the prurient interest . .. , (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a
patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law,
and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literaty, artistic, political, or
scientific value.").
189. See, e.g., Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501 (1951) ("It cannot be
doutihed that mntion pictures are a significant medium for the communication of
ideas."); State v. Theriault, 960 A.2d 687, 692 (N.H. 2008)(finding that "[to up-
hold the conviction in the instant case, where the only facts adduced at trial were that
the defendant offered to pay two people to have sexual intercourse while being video-
taped, would infringe upon an area of speech protected by the State Constitution");
People v. Freeman, 758 P.2d 1128, 1131 (Cal. 1988) (where the only payment made
was acting fees for the actors' performance in a non-obscene film, and "[t]here [was]
no evidence that defendant paid the acting fees for the purpose of sexual arousal or
gratification, his own or the actors' there is no violation of the state prostitution
statute) (cert. denied, 489 U.S. 10 17 (1989)). But see People v. Kovner, 409 N.Y.S.2d
349, 352 (Sup. Ct. 1978) ("While First Amendment considerations may protect the
dissemination of printed or photographic material regardless of the manner in which
it was obtained, this protection will not shield one against a prosecution for a crime
committed during the origination of the act.").
190. I have been asked by both scholars and sex workers if videotaping a sexual encounter
between a sex worker and her client would protect her from prostitution charges.
While I would not want to give legal advice, the videotape defense, coupled with a
contract that describes the nature of the exchange as acting services, would make for a
compelling case in challenging what seems to be a bizarre contradiction in the law be-
tween consent to pornography versus consent to prostitution. For example, in State v.
Theriaulr, 158 N.H. 123 (2008), the New Hampshire Supreme Court, when decid-
ing this issue under state constitutional law, stated, "Our holding today will not
prevent the State from continuing to prosecute prostitution, even when the acts are
videotaped," but would require the state to prove that the payment was for the pur-
pose of sexual arousal or gratification, as required under New Hampshire law. Id. at
130.
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Apart from the pragmatic question of whether extreme pornogra-
phy encourages violence against women, there is the principled question
as to whether we ought to allow women to consent to the filming of
material that depicts men raping and murdering women, or whether
doing so causes them harm.' 91 Women (and men) agree to be in pornog-
raphy for many reasons including coercion and abuse,' 92 the need and
desire to make money,9  to reap the benefits of fame,194 and Big Love
reasons. The law recognizes that choice by not prosecuting pornography
actors as prostitutes, rapists, or batterers. However, if you ever view one
of Zicari's films and the clips shown in the Frontline video, in which
some of his actresses are interviewed, you would likely have to acknowl-
edge that there is indeed physical harm, as well as emotional damage,
done to those women acting in these films. Therefore, I suspect that for
many women, starring in pornography may not be of their choosing,
despite their consent.
Yet, unlike domestic violence, the relationship between the theo-
retical wrongdoers, the producers and male actors who engage in the
violence, and the theoretical victims, the women who act in the films, is
often not an intimate relationship as much as a commercial one. To that
extent, one could argue that the law protects commercial transactions.
But prostitution is also a commercial transaction, and it remains illegal
in all states expect Nevada. Thus, commercialism alone cannot possibly
provide a principled answer for the law. In a similar vein, to the extent
that bans on prostitution are justified because commercial sex under-
mines the institution of marriage, as perhaps Lawrence suggests, one
only has to read the advice columns in the newspaper to see that plenty
of relationships are wrecked by one partner's addiction to internet por-
nography. Protecting marriage (if one even believes it to be preferable or
possible) doesn't account for certain prohibitions either. Thus, even as
191. See Cass R. Sunstein, Pornography and the First Amendment, 1986 DuKE L.J. 589,
595 (1986); Cass R. Sunstein, Words, Conduct, Caste, 60 U. CHI. L. Ray. 795, 809
(1993) (noting that women in this industry are often young, victims of sexual abuse
as children, and fotced into pornography, and that many of these "participants have
been beaten, forced to commit sex acts, imprisoned, bound and gagged, and tor-
tured"); see also Michelle McGovern, A Progressive Perspective on Pornography:
American Booksellers Association v. Hundt, 4 WIDENER L. Symp. J. 451, 456-59
(1999).
192. Sunstein, Pornography and the First Amendment, supra note 191, at 595; Words,
Conduct, Caste, supra note 191, at 809; McGovern, supra note 191,at 456-59.
193.Womn an Pon Inusty. The Reasons, REA.L SEX EDUCATON FACTs, http://
www.realsexedfacts.comwomen-and-porn-industry-reasons.htmil (last visited Apr.
18, 2010).
194. See LEvy, supra note 64, at 18 1-82 (discussing porn star Jenna Jameson's celebrity
while also noting that the industry is marked by 'violence and violation").
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we move away from the private sphere of intimate relationships to the
more public sphere of pornography, it is extremely difficult to articulate
what rationale the law might give for banning some activities while al-
lowing others.
CONCLUSION
In each of the cases presented in this Article, the potential for men
to exploit women is real, and yet, for the women involved, they may
derive some benefits, some pleasure, some joy, or some love from that
relationship. In each case, they may also suffer some harm-harm from
both male sexual and physical aggression, and harm from state interven-
tion. It is the simultaneous dilemma of pleasure and pain, and
autonomy and coercion, which makes deciding normative legal theory
so tticky.
Should the law allow Barb and her sister-wives to consent to polyg-
amy? Should it allow Mrs. Emmett to consent to asphyxiation and
burning? Should it allow Monique Brown to accept her husband's vio-
lent rage as part of their relationship without government interference?
Should the state wait until Brian Rooney's girlfriend is willing to pro-
ceed against him, knowing she likely will never do so as long as he has
the right to claim consent as a defense to his violent sexual aggression?
Should we allow Janet Romano to "act" in her husband's violent por-
nography even though it depicts, and perhaps encourages, men to rape
and kill women purely for self-gratification?
We can make all sorts of distinctions between these cases, but they
share in a common dilemma for feminist legal theory Each of these
cases leaves us wondering what the role of state intervention ought to be
in private, intimate relationships. We might draw the line at physical
violence, or require evidence of affirmative consent, or continue to disal-
low consent even in intimate relationships because of broader social
concerns, including public safety. We might forbid certain relationships
because they are intrinsically degrading to women, or we may take a
free-market approach and let individuals decide for themselves the limits
of their own autonomy. We might distinguish between commercial and
noncommercial activities, or the public and private sphere. For those
who embrace pragmatism rather than principle, we have so little evi-
dence-after so many years-that really helps us determine which
approach will maximize gender equality. We live in a world of empirical
uncertainty, which makes deciding these questions even harder to defini-
tively answer.
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To the extent that life imitates art, and art life, Big Love reminds us
that these tensions in life and law are not so easily resolved. The future
of feminist legal theory will depend, in large measure, on the ability of
scholars to boldly ask the questions that touch on gender equality, but
then to humbly propose the answers. And we have to be able to revisit
our positions, as I have attempted to do here. It is these tensions in the
series and in scholarship that keep us watching, and keep us writing. It
keeps feminist legal theory interesting, relevant, and challenging when it
might otherwise become pass6. Perhaps a guiding principle for future
feminist legal theory could be paraphrased from a Joan Armatrading
song: we need not be in love, but open to persuasion. Big Love seeks to
persuade us to accept ambivalence, and to be open to changing our
minds because of the complicated nature of the lives of women and
men; feminist legal theory ought to persuade us to do the same.t
